feat(security): harden local backup encryption

Write new backups as MDD2 envelopes with per-file scrypt salts, random IVs, and AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. Authenticate the versioned header and normalize malformed or tampered payload failures without exposing protected data.

Keep MDD1 decryption as read-only migration compatibility and add regression coverage for known legacy imports, truncation, unsupported versions, nondeterministic output, and tampering across every protected envelope field.
This commit is contained in:
Sucukdeluxe
2026-08-11 22:08:38 +02:00
parent de13f1bbde
commit 6f94e13cb5
2 changed files with 115 additions and 30 deletions
+36 -13
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ describe("backup-crypto", () => {
it("encrypts and decrypts a round-trip correctly", () => {
const original = JSON.stringify({
version: 2,
settings: { token: "my-secret-api-key", outputDir: "C:\\Downloads" },
settings: { outputDir: "C:\\Downloads" },
session: { packages: {}, items: {} },
history: [{ id: "h1", name: "Test" }]
});
@@ -16,39 +16,62 @@ describe("backup-crypto", () => {
});
it("produces binary output that is not plaintext readable", () => {
const secret = "super-secret-token-12345";
const plaintext = JSON.stringify({ settings: { token: secret } });
const sensitiveValue = "value-that-must-not-be-readable";
const plaintext = JSON.stringify({ settings: { value: sensitiveValue } });
const encrypted = encryptBackup(plaintext);
expect(encrypted.toString("utf8")).not.toContain(secret);
expect(encrypted.toString("latin1")).not.toContain(secret);
expect(encrypted.toString("utf8")).not.toContain(sensitiveValue);
expect(encrypted.toString("latin1")).not.toContain(sensitiveValue);
});
it("starts with the MDD1 magic bytes", () => {
it("writes the MDD2 backup format", () => {
const encrypted = encryptBackup("test");
expect(encrypted.subarray(0, 4).toString("utf8")).toBe("MDD1");
expect(encrypted.subarray(0, 4).toString("utf8")).toBe("MDD2");
expect(encrypted.length).toBeGreaterThan(48);
});
it("produces different ciphertext for the same input (random IV)", () => {
it("reads the legacy backup format for migration", () => {
const legacy = Buffer.from("TUREMQcHBwcHBwcHBwcHB7h4ood1DE8Wc+BPgzE6EYdio3HAN/UB1Mru6Fmvtw==", "base64");
expect(decryptBackup(legacy)).toBe("legacy payload");
});
it("uses a new salt and IV for every encryption", () => {
const plaintext = "same input data";
const a = encryptBackup(plaintext);
const b = encryptBackup(plaintext);
expect(a.equals(b)).toBe(false);
expect(a.subarray(4, 20).equals(b.subarray(4, 20))).toBe(false);
expect(a.subarray(20, 32).equals(b.subarray(20, 32))).toBe(false);
expect(decryptBackup(a)).toBe(plaintext);
expect(decryptBackup(b)).toBe(plaintext);
});
it("throws on truncated data", () => {
const encrypted = encryptBackup("test data");
const truncated = encrypted.subarray(0, 10);
expect(() => decryptBackup(truncated)).toThrow();
expect(() => decryptBackup(encrypted.subarray(0, 47))).toThrow(/zu kurz|ungültig/);
});
it("throws on corrupted ciphertext", () => {
it.each([
["salt", 4],
["IV", 20],
["authentication tag", 32],
["ciphertext", 48]
])("rejects a modified %s", (_part, offset) => {
const encrypted = encryptBackup("test data");
const corrupted = Buffer.from(encrypted);
corrupted[corrupted.length - 1] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => decryptBackup(corrupted)).toThrow();
corrupted[offset] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => decryptBackup(corrupted)).toThrow(/beschädigt|authentifiziert/);
});
it("rejects modified legacy authentication data", () => {
const legacy = Buffer.from("TUREMQcHBwcHBwcHBwcHB7h4ood1DE8Wc+BPgzE6EYdio3HAN/UB1Mru6Fmvtw==", "base64");
legacy[16] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => decryptBackup(legacy)).toThrow(/beschädigt|authentifiziert/);
});
it("rejects unsupported backup versions", () => {
const unsupported = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("MDD3"), Buffer.alloc(44)]);
expect(() => decryptBackup(unsupported)).toThrow(/Version/);
});
it("throws on wrong magic bytes", () => {