feat(security): harden local backup encryption

Write new backups as MDD2 envelopes with per-file scrypt salts, random IVs, and AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. Authenticate the versioned header and normalize malformed or tampered payload failures without exposing protected data.

Keep MDD1 decryption as read-only migration compatibility and add regression coverage for known legacy imports, truncation, unsupported versions, nondeterministic output, and tampering across every protected envelope field.
This commit is contained in:
Sucukdeluxe
2026-08-11 22:08:38 +02:00
parent de13f1bbde
commit 6f94e13cb5
2 changed files with 115 additions and 30 deletions
+79 -17
View File
@@ -2,38 +2,100 @@ import crypto from "node:crypto";
const APP_KEY_MATERIAL = "MDD-v2-backup-aes256gcm-2026";
const ALGORITHM = "aes-256-gcm";
const KEY_LENGTH = 32;
const SALT_LENGTH = 16;
const IV_LENGTH = 12;
const AUTH_TAG_LENGTH = 16;
const MAGIC = Buffer.from("MDD1");
const PREFIX = Buffer.from("MDD");
const LEGACY_MAGIC = Buffer.from("MDD1");
const MAGIC = Buffer.from("MDD2");
const LEGACY_HEADER_LENGTH = LEGACY_MAGIC.length + IV_LENGTH + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH;
const HEADER_LENGTH = MAGIC.length + SALT_LENGTH + IV_LENGTH + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH;
function deriveKey(): Buffer {
function deriveLegacyKey(): Buffer {
return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(APP_KEY_MATERIAL).digest();
}
function deriveKey(salt: Buffer): Buffer {
return crypto.scryptSync(APP_KEY_MATERIAL, salt, KEY_LENGTH);
}
function decryptAuthenticated(
ciphertext: Buffer,
key: Buffer,
iv: Buffer,
authTag: Buffer,
authenticatedData?: Buffer
): string {
try {
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv, { authTagLength: AUTH_TAG_LENGTH });
if (authenticatedData) {
decipher.setAAD(authenticatedData);
}
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]).toString("utf8");
} catch {
throw new Error("Backup-Datei ist beschädigt oder konnte nicht authentifiziert werden");
}
}
function decryptLegacyBackup(data: Buffer): string {
if (data.length < LEGACY_HEADER_LENGTH) {
throw new Error("Backup-Datei zu kurz oder ungültig");
}
const ivStart = LEGACY_MAGIC.length;
const authTagStart = ivStart + IV_LENGTH;
const ciphertextStart = authTagStart + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH;
return decryptAuthenticated(
data.subarray(ciphertextStart),
deriveLegacyKey(),
data.subarray(ivStart, authTagStart),
data.subarray(authTagStart, ciphertextStart)
);
}
function decryptCurrentBackup(data: Buffer): string {
if (data.length < HEADER_LENGTH) {
throw new Error("Backup-Datei zu kurz oder ungültig");
}
const saltStart = MAGIC.length;
const ivStart = saltStart + SALT_LENGTH;
const authTagStart = ivStart + IV_LENGTH;
const ciphertextStart = authTagStart + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH;
const salt = data.subarray(saltStart, ivStart);
const iv = data.subarray(ivStart, authTagStart);
return decryptAuthenticated(
data.subarray(ciphertextStart),
deriveKey(salt),
iv,
data.subarray(authTagStart, ciphertextStart),
data.subarray(0, authTagStart)
);
}
export function encryptBackup(plaintext: string): Buffer {
const key = deriveKey();
const salt = crypto.randomBytes(SALT_LENGTH);
const iv = crypto.randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
const key = deriveKey(salt);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv, { authTagLength: AUTH_TAG_LENGTH });
cipher.setAAD(Buffer.concat([MAGIC, salt, iv]));
const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
return Buffer.concat([MAGIC, iv, authTag, encrypted]);
return Buffer.concat([MAGIC, salt, iv, cipher.getAuthTag(), encrypted]);
}
export function decryptBackup(data: Buffer): string {
if (data.length < MAGIC.length + IV_LENGTH + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH) {
if (data.length < MAGIC.length) {
throw new Error("Backup-Datei zu kurz oder ungültig");
}
const magic = data.subarray(0, MAGIC.length);
if (!magic.equals(MAGIC)) {
throw new Error("Keine gültige MDD-Backup-Datei (falsche Signatur)");
if (magic.equals(MAGIC)) {
return decryptCurrentBackup(data);
}
const iv = data.subarray(MAGIC.length, MAGIC.length + IV_LENGTH);
const authTag = data.subarray(MAGIC.length + IV_LENGTH, MAGIC.length + IV_LENGTH + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH);
const ciphertext = data.subarray(MAGIC.length + IV_LENGTH + AUTH_TAG_LENGTH);
const key = deriveKey();
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv, { authTagLength: AUTH_TAG_LENGTH });
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
return decrypted.toString("utf8");
if (magic.equals(LEGACY_MAGIC)) {
return decryptLegacyBackup(data);
}
if (magic.subarray(0, PREFIX.length).equals(PREFIX)) {
throw new Error("Nicht unterstützte MDD-Backup-Version");
}
throw new Error("Keine gültige MDD-Backup-Datei (falsche Signatur)");
}
+36 -13
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ describe("backup-crypto", () => {
it("encrypts and decrypts a round-trip correctly", () => {
const original = JSON.stringify({
version: 2,
settings: { token: "my-secret-api-key", outputDir: "C:\\Downloads" },
settings: { outputDir: "C:\\Downloads" },
session: { packages: {}, items: {} },
history: [{ id: "h1", name: "Test" }]
});
@@ -16,39 +16,62 @@ describe("backup-crypto", () => {
});
it("produces binary output that is not plaintext readable", () => {
const secret = "super-secret-token-12345";
const plaintext = JSON.stringify({ settings: { token: secret } });
const sensitiveValue = "value-that-must-not-be-readable";
const plaintext = JSON.stringify({ settings: { value: sensitiveValue } });
const encrypted = encryptBackup(plaintext);
expect(encrypted.toString("utf8")).not.toContain(secret);
expect(encrypted.toString("latin1")).not.toContain(secret);
expect(encrypted.toString("utf8")).not.toContain(sensitiveValue);
expect(encrypted.toString("latin1")).not.toContain(sensitiveValue);
});
it("starts with the MDD1 magic bytes", () => {
it("writes the MDD2 backup format", () => {
const encrypted = encryptBackup("test");
expect(encrypted.subarray(0, 4).toString("utf8")).toBe("MDD1");
expect(encrypted.subarray(0, 4).toString("utf8")).toBe("MDD2");
expect(encrypted.length).toBeGreaterThan(48);
});
it("produces different ciphertext for the same input (random IV)", () => {
it("reads the legacy backup format for migration", () => {
const legacy = Buffer.from("TUREMQcHBwcHBwcHBwcHB7h4ood1DE8Wc+BPgzE6EYdio3HAN/UB1Mru6Fmvtw==", "base64");
expect(decryptBackup(legacy)).toBe("legacy payload");
});
it("uses a new salt and IV for every encryption", () => {
const plaintext = "same input data";
const a = encryptBackup(plaintext);
const b = encryptBackup(plaintext);
expect(a.equals(b)).toBe(false);
expect(a.subarray(4, 20).equals(b.subarray(4, 20))).toBe(false);
expect(a.subarray(20, 32).equals(b.subarray(20, 32))).toBe(false);
expect(decryptBackup(a)).toBe(plaintext);
expect(decryptBackup(b)).toBe(plaintext);
});
it("throws on truncated data", () => {
const encrypted = encryptBackup("test data");
const truncated = encrypted.subarray(0, 10);
expect(() => decryptBackup(truncated)).toThrow();
expect(() => decryptBackup(encrypted.subarray(0, 47))).toThrow(/zu kurz|ungültig/);
});
it("throws on corrupted ciphertext", () => {
it.each([
["salt", 4],
["IV", 20],
["authentication tag", 32],
["ciphertext", 48]
])("rejects a modified %s", (_part, offset) => {
const encrypted = encryptBackup("test data");
const corrupted = Buffer.from(encrypted);
corrupted[corrupted.length - 1] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => decryptBackup(corrupted)).toThrow();
corrupted[offset] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => decryptBackup(corrupted)).toThrow(/beschädigt|authentifiziert/);
});
it("rejects modified legacy authentication data", () => {
const legacy = Buffer.from("TUREMQcHBwcHBwcHBwcHB7h4ood1DE8Wc+BPgzE6EYdio3HAN/UB1Mru6Fmvtw==", "base64");
legacy[16] ^= 0xff;
expect(() => decryptBackup(legacy)).toThrow(/beschädigt|authentifiziert/);
});
it("rejects unsupported backup versions", () => {
const unsupported = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("MDD3"), Buffer.alloc(44)]);
expect(() => decryptBackup(unsupported)).toThrow(/Version/);
});
it("throws on wrong magic bytes", () => {