Apply the central Electron navigation policy to will-redirect in addition to will-navigate so main and remote-login windows block hostile redirect targets with the same exact host rules.
Make main-window webPreferences explicitly keep webSecurity enabled and insecure content disabled, and make allowlisted external URL opening await shell.openExternal so IPC returns false on denied or failed opens without unhandled rejections.
Expand focused coverage with hostile redirect cases, controlled shell failure handling, and AllDebrid Web behavior tests for existing-session generation plus login-required browser-window retry flow.
Add centralized browser security helpers for restrictive BrowserWindow profiles, navigation denial, popup denial, permission denial, and exact HTTPS host allowlists. Apply those policies to the main renderer window and to the Real-Debrid and AllDebrid browser-login windows without weakening the credential renderer boundary.
Add shared IPC sender validation for renderer handlers so development accepts only the local Vite origin and non-development accepts only the built file renderer tree. Route the registered renderer IPC handlers through the shared guard and restrict app:open-external to the same exact HTTPS allowlist.
Cover the hardening with focused red-green tests for untrusted navigation, popup handling, permission requests, exact host/subdomain matching, packaged file renderer boundaries, untrusted IPC senders, and both browser-login window profiles.
Sucukdeluxe