Sucukdeluxe
265498d629
Add centralized browser security helpers for restrictive BrowserWindow profiles, navigation denial, popup denial, permission denial, and exact HTTPS host allowlists. Apply those policies to the main renderer window and to the Real-Debrid and AllDebrid browser-login windows without weakening the credential renderer boundary. Add shared IPC sender validation for renderer handlers so development accepts only the local Vite origin and non-development accepts only the built file renderer tree. Route the registered renderer IPC handlers through the shared guard and restrict app:open-external to the same exact HTTPS allowlist. Cover the hardening with focused red-green tests for untrusted navigation, popup handling, permission requests, exact host/subdomain matching, packaged file renderer boundaries, untrusted IPC senders, and both browser-login window profiles.
67 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
67 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
import path from "node:path";
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import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { assertTrustedIpcSender } from "../src/main/ipc-security";
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function eventFor(url: string) {
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return {
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senderFrame: { url },
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sender: {
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getURL: () => url
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}
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};
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}
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describe("ipc-security", () => {
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it("accepts IPC from the configured Vite development renderer origin", () => {
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expect(() => assertTrustedIpcSender(eventFor("http://localhost:5180/settings"), {
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isPackaged: false,
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devServerUrl: "http://localhost:5180",
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appPath: "C:\\Program Files\\MDD"
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})).not.toThrow();
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});
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it("rejects IPC from development-origin lookalikes", () => {
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expect(() => assertTrustedIpcSender(eventFor("http://localhost.evil.example:5180/settings"), {
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isPackaged: false,
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devServerUrl: "http://localhost:5180",
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appPath: "C:\\Program Files\\MDD"
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})).toThrow("IPC-Absender ist nicht vertrauenswürdig");
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});
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it("accepts IPC from the packaged renderer file tree", () => {
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const appPath = path.join("C:", "Program Files", "MDD", "resources", "app.asar");
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const rendererUrl = pathToFileURL(path.join(appPath, "build", "renderer", "index.html")).toString();
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expect(() => assertTrustedIpcSender(eventFor(rendererUrl), {
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isPackaged: true,
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devServerUrl: "http://localhost:5180",
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appPath
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})).not.toThrow();
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});
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it("rejects IPC from local files outside the packaged renderer tree", () => {
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const appPath = path.join("C:", "Program Files", "MDD", "resources", "app.asar");
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const attackerUrl = pathToFileURL(path.join("C:", "Users", "Public", "attacker.html")).toString();
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expect(() => assertTrustedIpcSender(eventFor(attackerUrl), {
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isPackaged: true,
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devServerUrl: "http://localhost:5180",
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appPath
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})).toThrow("IPC-Absender ist nicht vertrauenswürdig");
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});
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it("rejects IPC when Electron provides no sender URL", () => {
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expect(() => assertTrustedIpcSender({
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senderFrame: null,
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sender: {
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getURL: () => ""
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}
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}, {
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isPackaged: false,
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devServerUrl: "http://localhost:5180",
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appPath: "C:\\Program Files\\MDD"
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})).toThrow("IPC-Absender ist nicht vertrauenswürdig");
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});
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});
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