From 134adb0213eb88cb62a58fe2b027c396747d1896 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 21:03:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/20] Stop automatic batches from re-uploading files the hoster rejected Automation-triggered starts and auto-retry rounds restarted every job in error state, including files a hoster permanently rejected (e.g. Byse "Not video file format"). Each new file in the watched folder thus re-uploaded the rejected 3-4 GB files again on two Byse accounts. Automatic starts now skip file-rejected jobs; manual starts still retry them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- renderer/app.js | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/renderer/app.js b/renderer/app.js index 2364ed1..2b56f66 100644 --- a/renderer/app.js +++ b/renderer/app.js @@ -444,6 +444,12 @@ function isStartableQueueJob(job) { return !!job && isStartableQueueStatus(job.status); } +function isAutomaticallyStartableQueueJob(job) { + if (!isStartableQueueJob(job)) return false; + if (job.status !== 'error' || !window.Stats) return true; + return window.Stats.classifyErrorCategory(job.error) !== 'file-rejected'; +} + // Queue state let queueJobs = []; // { id, file, fileName, hoster, status, bytesUploaded, bytesTotal, speedKbs, elapsed, remaining, error, result, attempt, maxAttempts, link } const _jobIndexById = new Map(); // id -> job (O(1) lookup) @@ -1039,7 +1045,7 @@ async function applyAutomationEvaluation(evaluation) { renderQueueTable(); persistQueueStateSoon(true); } else if (action === 'start') { - const result = await startUpload(); + const result = await startUpload({ _automationStart: true }); if (result?.ok === false) { return freezeAutomationValue({ ok: false, error: result.error, warning: null, admittedFiles: [], deferredFiles, paused: /pausiert/i.test(result.error), dryRun: false }); } @@ -4808,7 +4814,8 @@ async function startUpload(opts) { buildQueuePreview(); } - const jobsToStart = queueJobs.filter((job) => isStartableQueueStatus(job.status)); + const automaticStart = !!(opts && (opts._autoRetry || opts._automationStart)); + const jobsToStart = queueJobs.filter(automaticStart ? isAutomaticallyStartableQueueJob : isStartableQueueJob); if (jobsToStart.length === 0) { uploading = false; updateQueueActionButtons(); From 4c1a552fc098e344dd88b6c9929ce47779ba5fe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 21:07:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/20] Release 2.1.80 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 0598f82..b56f1f0 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.79", + "version": "2.1.80", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.79", + "version": "2.1.80", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 7ed753c..66899b7 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.79", + "version": "2.1.80", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From 6403dbd03ee5e4be26153ab947576d814fbd8936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 21:42:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/20] Update Electron to 42.11.12 for GHSA-fw47-9c62-h3vw npm audit flagged Electron <42.11.3 (HID/USB permission checks attributed to the wrong origin), which failed CI. Electron 42 no longer downloads its binary in postinstall; none of the other 42.0 breaking changes apply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 12 ++++++------ package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index b56f1f0..aefbe36 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ }, "devDependencies": { "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.32.1", - "electron": "^41.10.6", + "electron": "^42.11.12", "electron-builder": "^26.15.3", "eslint": "^10.8.1", "eslint-plugin-security": "^4.0.1", @@ -2073,11 +2073,10 @@ } }, "node_modules/electron": { - "version": "41.10.7", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/electron/-/electron-41.10.7.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-AqIiefddlf5i+HYCGatr8VlBuEbWJpad4/yloBFYcMB2r57j7xhW1ogiJ+BfA5kxQyfmSs5yjwy54Me+wJn1jw==", + "version": "42.11.12", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/electron/-/electron-42.11.12.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-fHlCHh1uqfvWykQUq8eoSoB5q1gej7z/KKd3m7rqEEhHhihm7qz/EvBIkDat7vQoIq3kGTJcrskLbJ6UFkYGyg==", "dev": true, - "hasInstallScript": true, "license": "MIT", "dependencies": { "@electron-internal/extract-zip": "^1.0.1", @@ -2085,7 +2084,8 @@ "@types/node": "^24.9.0" }, "bin": { - "electron": "cli.js" + "electron": "cli.js", + "install-electron": "install.js" }, "engines": { "node": ">= 22.12.0" diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 66899b7..5ef53db 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ }, "devDependencies": { "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.32.1", - "electron": "^41.10.6", + "electron": "^42.11.12", "electron-builder": "^26.15.3", "eslint": "^10.8.1", "eslint-plugin-security": "^4.0.1", From b5b81d8a8dd82852ee4ef6592e2439d8b8b89206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 21:44:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/20] Release 2.1.81 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index aefbe36..2155944 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.80", + "version": "2.1.81", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.80", + "version": "2.1.81", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 5ef53db..2d4b814 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.80", + "version": "2.1.81", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From b7be8d492a37c169778e8b54752fc62452a0ae15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:19:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/20] Let a later cleanup group take over a source whose earlier group has finished When the same file was registered for cleanup a second time (for example a repeated upload to one hoster), both groups blocked each other through the source lease and the file was never deleted, even after every hoster had succeeded. A later group now takes over the lease once every job of the earlier group has reached a terminal state; the earlier group is audited as superseded. Groups with a still running job keep blocking as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/source-file-cleanup.js | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/source-file-cleanup.js b/lib/source-file-cleanup.js index 9847a8b..72db854 100644 --- a/lib/source-file-cleanup.js +++ b/lib/source-file-cleanup.js @@ -174,7 +174,12 @@ function createSourceFileCleanup(options) { const canonicalFile = canonicalize(input.file); const manifest = createManifest(input, canonicalFile); const leaseToken = leases.get(canonicalFile); - if (leaseToken && leaseToken !== token) { + const previousOwner = leaseToken && leaseToken !== token ? groups.get(leaseToken) : null; + if (previousOwner && previousOwner.canonicalFile === canonicalFile && canBeSuperseded(previousOwner)) { + previousOwner.registrationOutcome = previousOwner.registrationOutcome || 'superseded'; + leases.set(canonicalFile, token); + await inspectRegistration(manifest); + } else if (leaseToken && leaseToken !== token) { manifest.registrationOutcome = 'blocked'; manifest.registrationError = new Error('active-source-lease'); const leaseOwner = groups.get(leaseToken); @@ -208,6 +213,12 @@ function createSourceFileCleanup(options) { return true; } + function canBeSuperseded(manifest) { + return !manifest.finalizationPromise + && manifest.jobs.size > 0 + && [...manifest.jobs.values()].every((job) => job.status !== 'pending'); + } + function isReady(manifest) { return !manifest.finalizationPromise && !manifest.registrationOutcome From 1b588ea167d9b25ae916ffd8f0366767b7381d99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:19:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/20] Count jobs added mid-batch in the batch summary total The total only counted the initial tasks, so batches that grew through addJobs() logged results such as ok=200 fail=-197. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/upload-manager.js | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/upload-manager.js b/lib/upload-manager.js index 4d8b3bd..bbf0279 100644 --- a/lib/upload-manager.js +++ b/lib/upload-manager.js @@ -432,6 +432,7 @@ class UploadManager extends EventEmitter { const results = new Map(); // filePath -> { name, size, results: [] } this._batchResults = results; this._additionalPromises = []; // Track jobs added mid-batch via addJobs() + this._batchTaskCount = tasks.length; const DEDUP_CHUNK = 200; for (let i = 0; i < tasks.length; i += DEDUP_CHUNK) { @@ -472,7 +473,7 @@ class UploadManager extends EventEmitter { this._emitStats(); const files = Array.from(results.values()); - const total = tasks.length; + const total = this._batchTaskCount; const succeeded = files.reduce((count, file) => count + file.results.filter((result) => result.status === 'done').length, 0); const skipped = files.reduce((count, file) => count + file.results.filter((result) => result.status === 'skipped').length, 0); @@ -1556,6 +1557,7 @@ class UploadManager extends EventEmitter { results.set(task.file, { name: fileName, size: 0, results: [] }); } this._additionalPromises.push(this._runJob(task, results, signal)); + this._batchTaskCount++; addResult.added++; } return addResult; From 09374476e07305b7ce492645c220b25f0b5ca4f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:38:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/20] Hide Matroska attachments from Byse so it accepts the video Byse rejects MKV files that carry an attachment (for example an embedded .nfo text file) with "Not video file format". Verified with clips cut from a rejected episode: the full clip is rejected, the same clip without the attachment track is accepted. For Byse uploads the Attachments element header is now rewritten into EBML Void elements of the same length while streaming. File size, offsets and all video, audio and subtitle tracks stay unchanged, the source file on disk is not modified, and other hosters receive the original bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/hosters.js | 11 ++- lib/matroska-attachments.js | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/upload-manager.js | 5 + scripts/verify-public-release.mjs | 1 + 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/matroska-attachments.js diff --git a/lib/hosters.js b/lib/hosters.js index 4afbcfe..15d3250 100644 --- a/lib/hosters.js +++ b/lib/hosters.js @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ const { statUploadFile, readUploadFile } = require('./upload-file-io'); +const { findAttachmentVoidPatches, applyPatches } = require('./matroska-attachments'); const path = require('path'); const crypto = require('crypto'); const { request } = require('undici'); @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ async function buildMultipart(filePath, formFields) { return { boundary, preambleBuf, epilogueBuf, totalSize, fileSize }; } -async function createUploadBody(filePath, formFields, onProgress, throttle, signal) { +async function createUploadBody(filePath, formFields, onProgress, throttle, signal, patches = []) { const { boundary, preambleBuf, epilogueBuf, totalSize, fileSize } = await buildMultipart(filePath, formFields); let bytesRead = 0; @@ -294,8 +295,9 @@ async function createUploadBody(filePath, formFields, onProgress, throttle, sign for await (const chunk of readUploadFile(filePath, signal)) { if (signal && signal.aborted) throw new Error('Aborted'); if (throttle) await throttle.consume(chunk.length, signal); + const chunkOffset = bytesRead; bytesRead += chunk.length; - yield chunk; + yield patches.length ? applyPatches(chunk, chunkOffset, patches) : chunk; if (onProgress) onProgress(bytesRead, fileSize); } yield epilogueBuf; @@ -556,7 +558,9 @@ async function uploadFile(hosterName, filePath, apiKey, onProgress, signal, thro const targetUrl = config.buildUploadUrl(uploadUrl, apiKey); const formFields = config.formFields(apiKey); - const { iterable, boundary, totalSize } = await createUploadBody(filePath, formFields, onProgress, throttle, signal); + const patches = hosterName === 'byse.sx' ? await findAttachmentVoidPatches(filePath).catch(() => []) : []; + if (patches.length && opts && typeof opts.onAttachmentsHidden === 'function') opts.onAttachmentsHidden(patches.length); + const { iterable, boundary, totalSize } = await createUploadBody(filePath, formFields, onProgress, throttle, signal, patches); const { body, statusCode, headers } = await request(targetUrl, { method: 'POST', @@ -717,6 +721,7 @@ module.exports = { prefetchBaseline, HOSTER_CONFIGS, __test: { + createUploadBody, extractUploadServerUrl, parseVoeResult, parseDoodstreamResult, diff --git a/lib/matroska-attachments.js b/lib/matroska-attachments.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df99ac4 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/matroska-attachments.js @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +const fs = require('node:fs'); + +const EBML_ID = 0x1A45DFA3; +const SEGMENT_ID = 0x18538067; +const SEEK_HEAD_ID = 0x114D9B74; +const SEEK_ID = 0x4DBB; +const SEEK_ID_ID = 0x53AB; +const SEEK_POSITION_ID = 0x53AC; +const ATTACHMENTS_ID = 0x1941A469; +const CLUSTER_ID = 0x1F43B675; +const VOID_ID = 0xEC; +const MAX_TOP_LEVEL_ELEMENTS = 256; +const MAX_SEEK_HEAD_BYTES = 64 * 1024; + +function readVint(buffer, offset, keepMarker) { + const first = buffer[offset]; + if (first === undefined || first === 0) return null; + let length = 1; + while (length <= 8 && !(first & (0x80 >> (length - 1)))) length++; + if (length > 8 || offset + length > buffer.length) return null; + let value = keepMarker ? first : first & (0xFF >> length); + let unknown = value === (0xFF >> length); + for (let index = 1; index < length; index++) { + const byte = buffer[offset + index]; + value = value * 256 + byte; + if (byte !== 0xFF) unknown = false; + } + return { value, length, unknown: !keepMarker && unknown }; +} + +function encodeVint(value, length) { + if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value < 0 || length < 1 || length > 8) return null; + if (value >= 2 ** (7 * length) - 1) return null; + const bytes = Buffer.alloc(length); + let rest = value; + for (let index = length - 1; index >= 0; index--) { + bytes[index] = rest % 256; + rest = Math.floor(rest / 256); + } + bytes[0] |= 0x80 >> (length - 1); + return bytes; +} + +function voidHeader(headerLength, payloadLength) { + const single = encodeVint(payloadLength, headerLength - 1); + if (single) return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([VOID_ID]), single]); + for (let sizeLength = 8; sizeLength >= 1; sizeLength--) { + const filler = headerLength - 2 - 1 - sizeLength; + if (filler < 0 || filler > 126) continue; + const size = encodeVint(payloadLength, sizeLength); + if (!size) continue; + return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([VOID_ID, 0x80 | filler]), Buffer.alloc(filler), Buffer.from([VOID_ID]), size]); + } + return null; +} + +async function readAt(handle, position, length) { + const buffer = Buffer.alloc(length); + const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, 0, length, position); + return buffer.subarray(0, bytesRead); +} + +async function readElementHeader(handle, position) { + const buffer = await readAt(handle, position, 12); + const id = readVint(buffer, 0, true); + if (!id || id.length > 4) return null; + const size = readVint(buffer, id.length, false); + if (!size) return null; + return { id: id.value, position, headerLength: id.length + size.length, size: size.unknown ? null : size.value }; +} + +function seekTargets(buffer, segmentDataStart) { + const targets = []; + let offset = 0; + while (offset < buffer.length) { + const id = readVint(buffer, offset, true); + const size = id && readVint(buffer, offset + id.length, false); + if (!id || !size || size.unknown) break; + const start = offset + id.length + size.length; + const end = start + size.value; + if (end > buffer.length) break; + if (id.value === SEEK_ID) { + let inner = start; + let seekId = null; + let seekPosition = null; + while (inner < end) { + const childId = readVint(buffer, inner, true); + const childSize = childId && readVint(buffer, inner + childId.length, false); + if (!childId || !childSize || childSize.unknown) break; + const valueStart = inner + childId.length + childSize.length; + const valueEnd = valueStart + childSize.value; + if (valueEnd > end) break; + let value = 0; + for (let index = valueStart; index < valueEnd; index++) value = value * 256 + buffer[index]; + if (childId.value === SEEK_ID_ID) seekId = value; + if (childId.value === SEEK_POSITION_ID) seekPosition = value; + inner = valueEnd; + } + if (seekId === ATTACHMENTS_ID && Number.isSafeInteger(seekPosition)) targets.push(segmentDataStart + seekPosition); + } + offset = end; + } + return targets; +} + +async function findAttachmentVoidPatches(filePath, { open = file => fs.promises.open(file, 'r') } = {}) { + const handle = await open(filePath); + try { + const { size: fileSize } = await handle.stat(); + const ebml = await readElementHeader(handle, 0); + if (!ebml || ebml.id !== EBML_ID || ebml.size === null) return []; + const segment = await readElementHeader(handle, ebml.headerLength + ebml.size); + if (!segment || segment.id !== SEGMENT_ID) return []; + const segmentDataStart = segment.position + segment.headerLength; + const segmentEnd = segment.size === null ? fileSize : Math.min(fileSize, segmentDataStart + segment.size); + const candidates = new Set(); + let position = segmentDataStart; + for (let count = 0; count < MAX_TOP_LEVEL_ELEMENTS && position < segmentEnd; count++) { + const element = await readElementHeader(handle, position); + if (!element || element.size === null || element.id === CLUSTER_ID) break; + if (element.id === ATTACHMENTS_ID) candidates.add(position); + if (element.id === SEEK_HEAD_ID && element.size <= MAX_SEEK_HEAD_BYTES) { + const content = await readAt(handle, position + element.headerLength, element.size); + for (const target of seekTargets(content, segmentDataStart)) candidates.add(target); + } + position += element.headerLength + element.size; + } + const patches = []; + for (const candidate of [...candidates].sort((a, b) => a - b)) { + const element = await readElementHeader(handle, candidate); + if (!element || element.id !== ATTACHMENTS_ID || element.size === null) continue; + if (candidate + element.headerLength + element.size > segmentEnd) continue; + const bytes = voidHeader(element.headerLength, element.size); + if (bytes && bytes.length === element.headerLength) patches.push({ offset: candidate, bytes }); + } + return patches; + } finally { + await handle.close(); + } +} + +function applyPatches(chunk, chunkOffset, patches) { + let patched = chunk; + for (const patch of patches) { + const start = Math.max(patch.offset, chunkOffset); + const end = Math.min(patch.offset + patch.bytes.length, chunkOffset + chunk.length); + if (start >= end) continue; + if (patched === chunk) patched = Buffer.from(chunk); + patch.bytes.copy(patched, start - chunkOffset, start - patch.offset, end - patch.offset); + } + return patched; +} + +module.exports = { findAttachmentVoidPatches, applyPatches, __test: { readVint, encodeVint, voidHeader } }; diff --git a/lib/upload-manager.js b/lib/upload-manager.js index bbf0279..1c0741b 100644 --- a/lib/upload-manager.js +++ b/lib/upload-manager.js @@ -1371,6 +1371,11 @@ class UploadManager extends EventEmitter { if (task.hoster === 'byse.sx') { baselineOpts.byseBaseline = await this._getBaseline('byse.sx', task.apiKey, signal); if (fileProbe && fileProbe.ok !== false) baselineOpts.probeIsVideoLike = fileProbe.isVideoLike === true; + baselineOpts.onAttachmentsHidden = (count) => this._rotLog('byse-attachments-hidden', { + jobId: task.jobId, + fileName: path.basename(task.file), + count + }); } if (task.hoster === 'doodstream.com') baselineOpts.doodBaseline = await this._getBaseline('doodstream.com', task.apiKey, signal); return uploadFile(task.hoster, task.file, task.apiKey, progressCb, signal, throttle, baselineOpts); diff --git a/scripts/verify-public-release.mjs b/scripts/verify-public-release.mjs index f9b2a2e..168a7d6 100644 --- a/scripts/verify-public-release.mjs +++ b/scripts/verify-public-release.mjs @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ const sourceFiles = [ 'lib/log-mode.js', 'lib/log-policy.js', 'lib/log-rotation.js', + 'lib/matroska-attachments.js', 'lib/mcp-access.js', 'lib/mcp-app.js', 'lib/mcp-diagnostics.js', From 432c0e01b846f809b650f74e2695b64a121abf79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:38:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/20] Release 2.1.82 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 2155944..0a61f7b 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.81", + "version": "2.1.82", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.81", + "version": "2.1.82", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 2d4b814..d7254e8 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.81", + "version": "2.1.82", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From 08f375621a7882b85bf100084382bb4c1a99b0db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:02:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/20] Add an MCP full-access permission that runs every action without local confirmation With full access the installation grants every capability, destructive and conditionally confirmed actions (queue retry/remove with source deletion, history clear, app restart, ...) run without the local dialog, and the new mhu_files_grant tool can add or widen directory grants. Narrowing or removing grants and changing permissions stay local. Enabling full access in the settings asks for local confirmation once. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/mcp-app.js | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/mcp-service.js | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- lib/mcp-store.js | 2 +- lib/mcp-tools.js | 6 ++++-- main.js | 3 ++- renderer/mcp.js | 7 ++++--- 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/mcp-app.js b/lib/mcp-app.js index f98300d..55381e8 100644 --- a/lib/mcp-app.js +++ b/lib/mcp-app.js @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ function page(items, args) { } function createMcpApp({ loadConfig, invoke, invokeGuarded = (_context, channel, ...args) => invoke(channel, ...args), renderer, collectors, getGrants, trashFile, canWrite, - getCapabilities, getProtectedPaths, getInstallationId, getDiagnosticSources, getRuntimeDiagnostics = () => null, getPerformance = () => null, getSystemMetrics = () => null, profile, updates }) { + getCapabilities, getProtectedPaths, getInstallationId, getDiagnosticSources, getRuntimeDiagnostics = () => null, getPerformance = () => null, getSystemMetrics = () => null, profile, updates, grantDirectory }) { const transfers = createMcpTransfers({ getGrants, getCapabilities, getProtectedPaths, getInstallationId }); const sanitize = createMcpSanitizer(loadConfig); const guard = context => { @@ -67,15 +67,21 @@ function createMcpApp({ loadConfig, invoke, invokeGuarded = (_context, channel, ...createMcpFiles({ getGrants, trashFile }), ...transfers.handlers, ...createMcpDiagnostics({ getSources: getDiagnosticSources, redact: text => sanitize(redactLogText(text, collectSecretValues(loadConfig()))) }), + mhu_files_grant: async ({ path: directory, readOnly, allowTransfer }, context) => { + canWrite(); guard(context); + if (typeof grantDirectory !== 'function') throw new McpAccessError('ACTION_UNAVAILABLE'); + return grantDirectory(directory, { readOnly: readOnly !== false, allowTransfer: allowTransfer === true }); + }, mhu_app_info: () => invoke('get-app-info'), mhu_capabilities: () => { const permissions = getCapabilities?.() || []; const settings = loadConfig().globalSettings; - return { permissions, tools: MCP_TOOLS.filter(tool => tool.requiredScopes.every(scope => permissions.includes(scope))).map(tool => ({ + const fullAccess = permissions.includes('full_access'); + return { permissions, tools: MCP_TOOLS.filter(tool => fullAccess || tool.requiredScopes.every(scope => permissions.includes(scope))).map(tool => ({ name: tool.name, readOnly: tool.annotations.readOnlyHint, requiredScopes: tool.requiredScopes, - localConfirmation: tool.destructive || requiresMcpConfirmation(tool.name, {}, settings), + localConfirmation: !fullAccess && (tool.destructive || requiresMcpConfirmation(tool.name, {}, settings)), conditionalConfirmation: tool.name === 'mhu_settings_update' - })), boundaries: ['Permissions and directory grants can only be changed locally.', 'Destructive actions require an exact local confirmation; MCP cannot approve it.', 'No arbitrary shell, SQL, mouse/keyboard or screen control.', 'Paused automation is resumed with mhu_automation_resume. A disabled monitor requires mhu_automation_start.'] }; + })), boundaries: [fullAccess ? 'Full access: actions run without local confirmation. Permissions, and narrowing or removing directory grants, can only be changed locally.' : 'Permissions and directory grants can only be changed locally.', fullAccess ? 'mhu_files_grant can add or widen directory grants.' : 'Destructive actions require an exact local confirmation; MCP cannot approve it.', 'No arbitrary shell, SQL, mouse/keyboard or screen control.', 'Paused automation is resumed with mhu_automation_resume. A disabled monitor requires mhu_automation_start.'] }; }, mhu_performance_get: () => getPerformance(), mhu_profile_start: args => profile.start(args.seconds), diff --git a/lib/mcp-service.js b/lib/mcp-service.js index 72c8c1d..26f19fa 100644 --- a/lib/mcp-service.js +++ b/lib/mcp-service.js @@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ class McpService { this.protocol = null; this.generation = 0; } - capabilities() { return this.active ? this.store.value.capabilities : []; } + capabilities() { + if (!this.active) return []; + return this.store.value.capabilities.includes('full_access') ? [...CAPABILITIES] : this.store.value.capabilities; + } state() { const { name, capabilities, grants, enabled, identity, revocations } = this.store.value; return { name, capabilities, grants, enabled: this.active && enabled, connection: this.connection, installationId: identity?.installationId || null, @@ -86,7 +89,7 @@ class McpService { } configure(args) { validateInput(args, { type: 'object', additionalProperties: false, required: ['enabled', 'name', 'capabilities'], properties: { - enabled: { type: 'boolean' }, name: { type: 'string', minLength: 1, maxLength: 100 }, capabilities: { type: 'array', maxItems: 5, items: { type: 'string', enum: CAPABILITIES } } + enabled: { type: 'boolean' }, name: { type: 'string', minLength: 1, maxLength: 100 }, capabilities: { type: 'array', maxItems: CAPABILITIES.length, items: { type: 'string', enum: CAPABILITIES } } } }); if (!args.name.trim()) throw new McpAccessError('INVALID_ARGUMENTS'); this.active = false; @@ -143,6 +146,22 @@ class McpService { this.publish(); return this.state(); }); } + grantDirectory(directory, { readOnly = true, allowTransfer = false } = {}) { + return this.serialize(async () => { + if (!this.ready) throw new McpAccessError('ACCESS_STORE_UNAVAILABLE'); + if (typeof directory !== 'string' || !path.isAbsolute(directory)) throw new McpAccessError('PATH_NOT_GRANTED'); + const resolved = await fs.realpath(directory).catch(() => { throw new McpAccessError('PATH_NOT_GRANTED'); }); + const stat = await fs.stat(resolved); + if (!stat.isDirectory() || path.parse(resolved).root === resolved) throw new McpAccessError('PATH_NOT_GRANTED'); + const existing = this.store.value.grants.find(grant => grant.path === resolved); + if (existing && ((existing.readOnly === false && readOnly) || (existing.allowTransfer === true && !allowTransfer))) throw new McpAccessError('GRANT_NARROWING_LOCAL_ONLY'); + if (!existing && this.store.value.grants.length >= 30) throw new McpAccessError('GRANT_LIMIT'); + const grant = existing ? { ...existing, readOnly, allowTransfer } : { id: randomUUID(), label: path.basename(resolved), path: resolved, readOnly, allowTransfer }; + await this.store.save({ ...this.store.value, grants: existing ? this.store.value.grants.map(item => item.id === existing.id ? grant : item) : [...this.store.value.grants, grant] }); + this.publish(); + return { id: grant.id, label: grant.label, readOnly: grant.readOnly, allowTransfer: grant.allowTransfer }; + }); + } updateGrant(id, remove, readOnly = true, allowTransfer) { const generation = this.generation; return this.serialize(async () => { diff --git a/lib/mcp-store.js b/lib/mcp-store.js index 95d90c8..5313234 100644 --- a/lib/mcp-store.js +++ b/lib/mcp-store.js @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ const { randomUUID, randomBytes } = require('node:crypto'); const { McpAccessError } = require('./mcp-access'); const RELAY_URL = 'https://downloader.24-music.de/mcp-relay'; -const CAPABILITIES = ['read', 'control', 'files', 'secrets', 'updates']; +const CAPABILITIES = ['read', 'control', 'files', 'secrets', 'updates', 'full_access']; class McpStore { constructor({ directory, encrypt, decrypt }) { diff --git a/lib/mcp-tools.js b/lib/mcp-tools.js index f15a8bd..e998b8c 100644 --- a/lib/mcp-tools.js +++ b/lib/mcp-tools.js @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ const definitions = [ { transferId: id, offset: integer(0, 32 * 1024 ** 3), length: integer(1, 1024 * 1024) }, ['transferId', 'offset']], ['files_transfer_close', 'Close an owned temporary transfer handle without modifying its source file.', 'files', { transferId: id }, ['transferId']], ['files_delete', 'Delete a specifically selected file inside a writable grant.', 'files.write', file, ['rootId', 'relativePath'], true], + ['files_grant', 'Grant or widen access to an absolute local directory. Requires full access; narrowing or removing a grant stays local.', 'full_access', { path: text(), readOnly: boolean, allowTransfer: boolean }, ['path']], ['cloud_status', 'Read CloudDrop log synchronization state.', 'read', {}, []], ['cloud_configure', 'Enable or disable CloudDrop log sync with the saved or supplied key.', 'settings', { enabled: boolean, apiKey: text(200) }, ['enabled']], ['cloud_backfill', 'Queue missing entries from the current local upload log.', 'control', {}, []], @@ -131,7 +132,8 @@ function createMcpToolAdapter({ handlers, authorizeConfirmation, sanitize, audit const tool = byName.get(name); if (!tool || typeof handlers[name] !== 'function') throw new McpAccessError('TOOL_UNAVAILABLE'); const allowed = () => getCapabilities ? getCapabilities() : context?.scopes; - const permitted = () => Array.isArray(allowed()) && tool.requiredScopes.every(scope => allowed().includes(scope)); + const fullAccess = () => Array.isArray(allowed()) && allowed().includes('full_access'); + const permitted = () => Array.isArray(allowed()) && (fullAccess() || tool.requiredScopes.every(scope => allowed().includes(scope))); if (!permitted()) throw new McpAccessError('SCOPE_DENIED'); validateInput(args, tool.inputSchema); if (context.signal?.aborted || !Number.isFinite(context.deadline) || context.deadline <= Date.now()) throw new McpAccessError('REQUEST_EXPIRED'); @@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ function createMcpToolAdapter({ handlers, authorizeConfirmation, sanitize, audit const startedAt = Date.now(); if (context.signal?.aborted || Date.now() >= context.deadline) throw new McpAccessError('REQUEST_EXPIRED'); if (!permitted()) throw new McpAccessError('SCOPE_DENIED'); - if ((tool.destructive || requiresConfirmation(name, args)) && (!authorizeConfirmation || !await authorizeConfirmation({ tool: name, digest, args, context }))) throw new McpAccessError('CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED'); + if (!fullAccess() && (tool.destructive || requiresConfirmation(name, args)) && (!authorizeConfirmation || !await authorizeConfirmation({ tool: name, digest, args, context }))) throw new McpAccessError('CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED'); if (context.signal?.aborted || Date.now() >= context.deadline) throw new McpAccessError('REQUEST_EXPIRED'); if (!permitted()) throw new McpAccessError('SCOPE_DENIED'); audit({ tool: name, event: 'started', requestId: context.requestId, durationMs: 0 }); diff --git a/main.js b/main.js index 7ae5bbd..0e8e4e2 100644 --- a/main.js +++ b/main.js @@ -4270,6 +4270,7 @@ async function startMcpService() { getSystemMetrics: args => systemMetrics.snapshot(args), getGrants: () => mcpService?.store.value.grants || [], trashFile: file => require('electron').shell.trashItem(file), canWrite: assertConfigWriteAllowed, getCapabilities: () => mcpService?.capabilities() || [], + grantDirectory: (directory, options) => mcpService.grantDirectory(directory, options), getProtectedPaths: () => [app.getPath('userData'), configStore.filePath, configStore.historyPath, configStore.automationCompletionPath], getInstallationId: () => mcpService?.store.value.identity?.installationId, getRuntimeDiagnostics: () => ({ @@ -4307,7 +4308,7 @@ ipcMain.on('mcp:reply', (event, payload) => { }); ipcMain.handle('mcp:configure', async (event, args) => { if (!isTrustedOnlineBackupIpcEvent(event) || !mcpService) throw new Error('MCP_ACCESS_DENIED'); - if (args?.enabled && (args.capabilities?.includes('secrets') || (args.capabilities?.includes('updates') && !mcpService.capabilities().includes('updates')) || !mcpService.active)) { + if (args?.enabled && (args.capabilities?.includes('secrets') || (args.capabilities?.includes('full_access') && !mcpService.capabilities().includes('full_access')) || (args.capabilities?.includes('updates') && !mcpService.capabilities().includes('updates')) || !mcpService.active)) { const result = await dialog.showMessageBox(mainWindow, { type: 'warning', title: 'MCP-Zugriff / MCP access', message: 'MCP-Zugriff mit diesen Berechtigungen aktivieren? / Enable MCP with these capabilities?', detail: String(args.capabilities?.join(', ') || '').slice(0, 100), buttons: ['Abbrechen / Cancel', 'Aktivieren / Enable'], defaultId: 0, cancelId: 0, noLink: true }); if (result.response !== 1) return mcpService.state(); diff --git a/renderer/mcp.js b/renderer/mcp.js index 3752cbf..6c1ee26 100644 --- a/renderer/mcp.js +++ b/renderer/mcp.js @@ -222,8 +222,9 @@ ['control','App steuern','Control app','Uploads und Konten verwalten. Kritische Aktionen lokal bestätigen.','Manage uploads and accounts. Confirm critical actions locally.'], ['files','Freigegebene Ordner','Granted directories','Auf ausgewählte Ordner zugreifen. Dateiinhalte separat freigeben.','Access selected directories. Allow file contents separately.'], ['updates','App-Updates installieren','Install app updates','Geprüfte Updates ohne erneute Bestätigung installieren. Uploads abschließen und danach fortsetzen. Keine Portable-Versionen.','Install verified updates without another confirmation. Finish uploads and resume afterwards. No portable versions.'], - ['secrets','Zugangsdaten auslesen','Reveal credentials','Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten ausdrücklich freigeben. Zusätzliche lokale Bestätigung erforderlich.','Explicitly allow saved credentials to be read. Additional local confirmation required.'] - ].map(([value,de,en,description,englishDescription])=>``).join('')} + ['secrets','Zugangsdaten auslesen','Reveal credentials','Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten ausdrücklich freigeben. Zusätzliche lokale Bestätigung erforderlich.','Explicitly allow saved credentials to be read. Additional local confirmation required.'], + ['full_access','Vollzugriff ohne Bestätigung','Full access without confirmation','Alle Aktionen ohne lokale Bestätigung ausführen, auch Löschen, Wiederholen mit Quelldatei-Löschung, Ordnerfreigaben und Zugangsdaten.','Run every action without local confirmation, including deletions, retries with source deletion, directory grants and credentials.'] + ].map(([value,de,en,description,englishDescription])=>``).join('')}

${text('Erst speichern und aktivieren, dann den Verbindungscode kopieren.', 'Save and enable first, then copy the connection code.')}

@@ -233,7 +234,7 @@

${text('Zugang verwalten', 'Manage access')}

-

${text('Der Verbindungscode ist ein Zugangsschlüssel. Er wird weder im Backup gespeichert noch auf andere Installationen übertragen. Löschungen und andere gefährliche Aktionen verlangen eine lokale Bestätigung.', 'The connection code is a credential. It is not stored in backups or transferred to other installations. Deletions and other dangerous actions require local confirmation.')}

+

${text('Der Verbindungscode ist ein Zugangsschlüssel. Er wird weder im Backup gespeichert noch auf andere Installationen übertragen. Löschungen und andere gefährliche Aktionen verlangen eine lokale Bestätigung, außer bei Vollzugriff.', 'The connection code is a credential. It is not stored in backups or transferred to other installations. Deletions and other dangerous actions require local confirmation unless full access is granted.')}

${text('Zugang erneuern macht den bisherigen Code ungültig. Deaktivieren beendet den Fernzugriff und widerruft den Zugang.', 'Rotating access invalidates the previous code. Disabling remote access revokes access.')}

From 9b711292e9882576a86611d309e8b3c27157ead9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:02:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/20] Release 2.1.83 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 0a61f7b..3e52bab 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.82", + "version": "2.1.83", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.82", + "version": "2.1.83", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index d7254e8..2fe3214 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.82", + "version": "2.1.83", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From 469a1fd8b5dad2fc0ebff3e828529fa25ecd8f29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:38:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/20] Translate the MCP full-access texts to English Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- renderer/i18n.js | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/renderer/i18n.js b/renderer/i18n.js index e3658fe..0017178 100644 --- a/renderer/i18n.js +++ b/renderer/i18n.js @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ ['Geprüfte Updates ohne erneute Bestätigung installieren. Uploads abschließen und danach fortsetzen. Keine Portable-Versionen.', 'Install verified updates without another confirmation. Finish uploads and resume afterwards. No portable versions.'], ['Zugangsdaten auslesen', 'Reveal credentials'], ['Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten ausdrücklich freigeben. Zusätzliche lokale Bestätigung erforderlich.', 'Explicitly allow saved credentials to be read. Additional local confirmation required.'], + ['Vollzugriff ohne Bestätigung', 'Full access without confirmation'], + ['Alle Aktionen ohne lokale Bestätigung ausführen, auch Löschen, Wiederholen mit Quelldatei-Löschung, Ordnerfreigaben und Zugangsdaten.', 'Run every action without local confirmation, including deletions, retries with source deletion, directory grants and credentials.'], ['Ordnerfreigaben', 'Directory access'], ['Keine Ordner freigegeben.', 'No directories granted.'], ['Zugang verwalten', 'Manage access'], @@ -60,6 +62,7 @@ ['Letzter Kontakt', 'Last contact'], ['Ausstehende Widerrufe', 'Pending revocations'], ['Der Verbindungscode ist ein Zugangsschlüssel. Er wird weder im Backup gespeichert noch auf andere Installationen übertragen. Löschungen und andere gefährliche Aktionen verlangen eine lokale Bestätigung.', 'The connection code is a credential. It is not stored in backups or transferred to other installations. Deletions and other dangerous actions require local confirmation.'], + ['Der Verbindungscode ist ein Zugangsschlüssel. Er wird weder im Backup gespeichert noch auf andere Installationen übertragen. Löschungen und andere gefährliche Aktionen verlangen eine lokale Bestätigung, außer bei Vollzugriff.', 'The connection code is a credential. It is not stored in backups or transferred to other installations. Deletions and other dangerous actions require local confirmation unless full access is granted.'], ['Ordner freigeben', 'Grant directory'], ['Schreibzugriff', 'Write access'], ['MCP-Aktion fehlgeschlagen. Verbindung und lokale Berechtigungen prüfen.', 'MCP action failed. Check connection and local permissions.'], From 909149bd6470a1c90104be4630481c06d0843182 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:38:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/20] Update Electron to 45.0.0 Clipboard writes are awaited because clipboard.writeText returns a Promise since Electron 44. Preloads only load electron, so the removed sandbox shims in Electron 45 do not apply; the synchronous safeStorage API is deprecated but still available. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- main.js | 8 ++++---- package-lock.json | 8 ++++---- package.json | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/main.js b/main.js index 0e8e4e2..caa89d7 100644 --- a/main.js +++ b/main.js @@ -3631,8 +3631,8 @@ ipcMain.handle('import-upload-log', async () => { return { entries, path: filePaths[0] }; }); -ipcMain.handle('copy-to-clipboard', (_event, text) => { - clipboard.writeText(text); +ipcMain.handle('copy-to-clipboard', async (_event, text) => { + await clipboard.writeText(text); return true; }); @@ -4320,9 +4320,9 @@ ipcMain.handle('mcp:rotate', async event => { const result = await dialog.showMessageBox(mainWindow, { type: 'warning', message: shellText('MCP-Zugang erneuern? Der bisherige Code wird ungültig.', 'Rotate MCP access? The previous code becomes invalid.'), buttons: ['Abbrechen / Cancel', 'Erneuern / Rotate'], defaultId: 0, cancelId: 0, noLink: true }); return result.response === 1 ? mcpService.rotate() : mcpService.state(); }); -ipcMain.handle('mcp:copy-code', event => { +ipcMain.handle('mcp:copy-code', async event => { if (!isTrustedOnlineBackupIpcEvent(event) || !mcpService?.active) throw new Error('MCP_ACCESS_DENIED'); - clipboard.writeText(mcpService.store.code()); + await clipboard.writeText(mcpService.store.code()); return true; }); ipcMain.handle('mcp:add-grant', async event => { diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 3e52bab..3099344 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ }, "devDependencies": { "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.32.1", - "electron": "^42.11.12", + "electron": "^45.0.0", "electron-builder": "^26.15.3", "eslint": "^10.8.1", "eslint-plugin-security": "^4.0.1", @@ -2073,9 +2073,9 @@ } }, "node_modules/electron": { - "version": "42.11.12", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/electron/-/electron-42.11.12.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-fHlCHh1uqfvWykQUq8eoSoB5q1gej7z/KKd3m7rqEEhHhihm7qz/EvBIkDat7vQoIq3kGTJcrskLbJ6UFkYGyg==", + "version": "45.0.0", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/electron/-/electron-45.0.0.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-yjz4uhMBcO6L5X7CWgRMobf2EMJPnb9j4zuf+nu/TU/6E4Sqfx7fn/a2eACo4qngjml/0JnsoZhxYroJLxLd2w==", "dev": true, "license": "MIT", "dependencies": { diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 2fe3214..546d5a6 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ }, "devDependencies": { "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.32.1", - "electron": "^42.11.12", + "electron": "^45.0.0", "electron-builder": "^26.15.3", "eslint": "^10.8.1", "eslint-plugin-security": "^4.0.1", From d7814e1b48c1435c858d17980c977697290ea88c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:57:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/20] Release 2.1.84 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 3099344..c8a60df 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.83", + "version": "2.1.84", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.83", + "version": "2.1.84", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 546d5a6..6876847 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.83", + "version": "2.1.84", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From d63a972591120d8506bed90cdd4d143f5b3abd1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 02:36:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/20] Keep CloudDrop upload logs in one document up to 4 MB Logs were split into a new CloudDrop document every 700 KB, so a session log of about 1 MB appeared as two files. CloudDrop accepts text documents up to 5 MB, so the limit is now 4 MB and the response limit of the log API leaves room for JSON-escaped paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/cloud-log-sync.js | 2 +- lib/clouddrop-log-api.js | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/cloud-log-sync.js b/lib/cloud-log-sync.js index 33636a1..eebbbc0 100644 --- a/lib/cloud-log-sync.js +++ b/lib/cloud-log-sync.js @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ const { EventEmitter } = require('node:events'); const { ClouddropLogApi, CloudLogError } = require('./clouddrop-log-api'); const { iterateUploadLogEntries } = require('./upload-log'); -const MAX_DOCUMENT_BYTES = 700000; +const MAX_DOCUMENT_BYTES = 4000000; const hash = value => createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex'); const validId = value => typeof value === 'string' && /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,100}$/.test(value); const blocksRetry = code => ['INVALID_KEY', 'ACCESS_DENIED', 'UNRESTRICTED_KEY_REQUIRED', diff --git a/lib/clouddrop-log-api.js b/lib/clouddrop-log-api.js index 8f17b21..a3c99a4 100644 --- a/lib/clouddrop-log-api.js +++ b/lib/clouddrop-log-api.js @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ class ClouddropLogApi { let size = 0; for await (const chunk of response.body) { size += chunk.length; - if (size > 2 * 1024 * 1024) { + if (size > 10 * 1024 * 1024) { response.body.destroy(); throw new CloudLogError('RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE'); } From 94e7b91797233af100138f9f2909071fbe41a454 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 02:38:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/20] Release 2.1.85 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index c8a60df..631f83f 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.84", + "version": "2.1.85", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.84", + "version": "2.1.85", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 6876847..ee6c04e 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.84", + "version": "2.1.85", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From 0b30a9180a27a0a4f445b08aa11aa7a867bc9176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 07:57:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/20] Migrate credential encryption to the async safeStorage API Electron 45 deprecates the synchronous safeStorage methods and Electron 46 removes them. Credential encryption now uses encryptStringAsync, decryptStringAsync and isAsyncEncryptionAvailable. - secret-store: async encryptField/decryptField/encryptCredentials/ decryptCredentials, decryptFieldWithStatus exposes shouldReEncrypt. Unavailable or failing encryption still rejects with the existing SECRET_STORE_* codes; legacy plaintext stays readable. - config-store: the first load runs asynchronously through init(); writes encrypt before the atomic write. A synchronous load() of an encrypted config before init() fails with SECRET_STORE_NOT_READY and schedules a refresh. Values flagged with shouldReEncrypt are re-encrypted once after loading. - main: await configStore.init() after app ready, before the first load. - MCP access store and online backup keyring await the async helpers; MCP saves keep their call order. Existing enc:v1 values written with encryptString stay readable: on Windows both APIs use the same v10 format and Local State key, verified in both directions with real Electron 41 and 45. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- README.md | 2 +- lib/config-store.js | 52 ++++++++++++++------- lib/mcp-store.js | 23 ++++++--- lib/online-backup-keyring.js | 20 ++++---- lib/online-backup-manager.js | 2 +- lib/secret-store.js | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- main.js | 1 + 7 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0f58b4a..e4f2958 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ English is the default language for new profiles. Open **Settings > General** to ### Local data and credentials -Settings, pending queue state, and upload history are stored in Electron's user-data directory. Passwords and API keys must be encrypted with Electron `safeStorage` before they are written. On Windows, `safeStorage` uses DPAPI and ties encrypted values to the current Windows user profile. If operating-system encryption is unavailable or encryption fails, the write is rejected and credentials are never written as plaintext. Legacy plaintext credentials remain readable for migration and are encrypted during the next successful save. +Settings, pending queue state, and upload history are stored in Electron's user-data directory. Passwords and API keys must be encrypted with Electron `safeStorage` before they are written. On Windows, `safeStorage` uses DPAPI and ties encrypted values to the current Windows user profile. If operating-system encryption is unavailable or encryption fails, the write is rejected and credentials are never written as plaintext. Legacy plaintext credentials remain readable for migration and are encrypted during the next successful save. The app uses the asynchronous `safeStorage` API (`encryptStringAsync`, `decryptStringAsync`, `isAsyncEncryptionAvailable`). Values encrypted by earlier versions with the synchronous API keep the same `enc:v1:` format and remain readable; when `decryptStringAsync` reports `shouldReEncrypt`, the settings file is re-encrypted once after loading. Credentials are decrypted when required for account validation or upload to the selected host. Do not share application data files, backup files, screenshots containing credentials, or generated backup keys. diff --git a/lib/config-store.js b/lib/config-store.js index 4635d23..6c7e58d 100644 --- a/lib/config-store.js +++ b/lib/config-store.js @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ class ConfigStore { this._cacheKey = ''; this._lastConfigCheck = 0; this._refreshTask = null; + this._reEncryptScheduled = false; this._perfLog = null; this._wqDepth = 0; @@ -458,11 +459,24 @@ class ConfigStore { const rotationCursors = (data.rotationCursors && typeof data.rotationCursors === 'object' && !Array.isArray(data.rotationCursors)) ? data.rotationCursors : {}; - const result = { hosters, hosterSettings, globalSettings, history: this._historyMigrated ? [] : (data.history || []), rotationCursors }; - // Decrypt credentials stored with safeStorage so the rest of the app - // keeps working with plaintext in memory. - secretStore.decryptCredentials(result); - return result; + return { hosters, hosterSettings, globalSettings, history: this._historyMigrated ? [] : (data.history || []), rotationCursors }; + } + + async _normalizeAndDecrypt(data) { + const config = this._normalizeConfig(data); + const { shouldReEncrypt } = await secretStore.decryptCredentials(config); + return { config, shouldReEncrypt }; + } + + init() { + if (this._cache) return Promise.resolve(); + return this.refresh(); + } + + _scheduleReEncrypt() { + if (this._reEncryptScheduled || this._writesQuiesced) return; + this._reEncryptScheduled = true; + void this._enqueueWrite(async () => this._commit(this.load())).catch(() => {}); } _loadImpl() { @@ -475,11 +489,14 @@ class ConfigStore { try { data = this._readAndParse(file); } catch {} if (data) break; } - try { this._cache = this._normalizeConfig(data || {}); } - catch (error) { - if (error instanceof secretStore.SecretStoreError) throw error; - this._cache = this._normalizeConfig({}); + let normalized; + try { normalized = this._normalizeConfig(data || {}); } + catch { normalized = this._normalizeConfig({}); } + if (secretStore.hasEncryptedCredentials(normalized)) { + this._scheduleConfigRefresh(); + throw new secretStore.SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_NOT_READY', 'Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten wurden noch nicht geladen'); } + this._cache = normalized; this._lastConfigCheck = Date.now(); return this._clone(this._cache); } @@ -508,8 +525,10 @@ class ConfigStore { try { const data = JSON.parse(await fs.promises.readFile(file, 'utf8')); if (!data || typeof data !== 'object' || Array.isArray(data)) continue; - this._cache = this._normalizeConfig(data); + const { config, shouldReEncrypt } = await this._normalizeAndDecrypt(data); + this._cache = config; this._cacheKey = file === this.filePath ? key : ''; + if (shouldReEncrypt) this._scheduleReEncrypt(); return; } catch (error) { if (error instanceof secretStore.SecretStoreError) throw error; @@ -523,20 +542,20 @@ class ConfigStore { // (history, globalSettings, …) is referenced read-only into the stringified // object. Deep-cloning the whole config here (incl. an ever-growing history) // on every write was a primary long-running main-thread stall. - _serializeForDisk(config) { + async _serializeForDisk(config) { const hosters = this._clone(config.hosters || {}); const globalSettings = this._clone(config.globalSettings || {}); delete globalSettings.remote; delete globalSettings.diagnostics; delete globalSettings.allowPlaintextCredentialStorage; - secretStore.encryptCredentials({ hosters, globalSettings }); + await secretStore.encryptCredentials({ hosters, globalSettings }); return JSON.stringify({ ...config, globalSettings, hosters }, null, 2); } - _commit(config) { - if (!this._perfLog) return this._atomicWrite(this._serializeForDisk(config)); + async _commit(config) { + if (!this._perfLog) return this._atomicWrite(await this._serializeForDisk(config)); const t0 = performance.now(); - const data = this._serializeForDisk(config); + const data = await this._serializeForDisk(config); const dt = performance.now() - t0; if (dt >= 20) { const q = this._pqLen(config.globalSettings); @@ -819,6 +838,7 @@ class ConfigStore { } async _atomicWrite(data) { + const { config: nextCache } = await this._normalizeAndDecrypt(JSON.parse(data)); const tmpPath = this.filePath + '.tmp'; const backupPath = this.filePath + '.bak'; const fileHandle = await fs.promises.open(tmpPath, 'w'); @@ -836,7 +856,7 @@ class ConfigStore { if (current && current.trim().length > 2) await fs.promises.writeFile(backupPath, current, 'utf-8'); } catch {} await fs.promises.rename(tmpPath, this.filePath); - this._cache = this._normalizeConfig(JSON.parse(data)); + this._cache = nextCache; this._cacheKey = ''; this._lastConfigCheck = Date.now(); } diff --git a/lib/mcp-store.js b/lib/mcp-store.js index 5313234..abc9eb6 100644 --- a/lib/mcp-store.js +++ b/lib/mcp-store.js @@ -27,15 +27,18 @@ class McpStore { || value.grants.some(grant => !grant || typeof grant.id !== 'string' || typeof grant.path !== 'string' || !path.isAbsolute(grant.path) || typeof grant.label !== 'string' || typeof grant.readOnly !== 'boolean' || (grant.allowTransfer !== undefined && typeof grant.allowTransfer !== 'boolean'))) throw new Error('format'); - const decode = identity => { + const decode = async identity => { if (!identity) return null; if (identity.relayUrl !== RELAY_URL || !/^[a-f0-9-]{36}$/.test(identity.installationId)) throw new Error('identity'); if (!identity.agentToken?.startsWith('enc:v1:') || !identity.clientToken?.startsWith('enc:v1:')) throw new Error('encryption'); - const decoded = { ...identity, agentToken: this.decrypt(identity.agentToken), clientToken: this.decrypt(identity.clientToken) }; + const decoded = { ...identity, agentToken: await this.decrypt(identity.agentToken), clientToken: await this.decrypt(identity.clientToken) }; if (![decoded.agentToken, decoded.clientToken].every(token => /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(token)) || decoded.agentToken === decoded.clientToken) throw new Error('credentials'); return decoded; }; - this.value = { ...value, capabilities: value.capabilities.filter(item => CAPABILITIES.includes(item)), identity: decode(value.identity), revocations: value.revocations.map(decode) }; + const identity = await decode(value.identity); + const revocations = []; + for (const revoked of value.revocations) revocations.push(await decode(revoked)); + this.value = { ...value, capabilities: value.capabilities.filter(item => CAPABILITIES.includes(item)), identity, revocations }; if (disabled) { this.value.enabled = false; if (this.value.identity) { @@ -55,13 +58,21 @@ class McpStore { finally { await handle.close(); } } async clearDisabled() { await fs.unlink(this.disabledMarker).catch(error => { if (error.code !== 'ENOENT') throw error; }); } - async save(next) { - const encode = identity => identity ? { ...identity, agentToken: this.encrypt(identity.agentToken), clientToken: this.encrypt(identity.clientToken) } : null; - const disk = { ...next, identity: encode(next.identity), revocations: next.revocations.map(encode) }; + async _encode(next) { + const encode = async identity => identity ? { ...identity, agentToken: await this.encrypt(identity.agentToken), clientToken: await this.encrypt(identity.clientToken) } : null; + const revocations = []; + for (const revoked of next.revocations) revocations.push(await encode(revoked)); + const disk = { ...next, identity: await encode(next.identity), revocations }; for (const identity of [disk.identity, ...disk.revocations].filter(Boolean)) { if (!identity.agentToken.startsWith('enc:v1:') || !identity.clientToken.startsWith('enc:v1:')) throw new McpAccessError('ENCRYPTION_UNAVAILABLE'); } + return disk; + } + save(next) { + const encoded = this._encode(next); + encoded.catch(() => {}); const task = this.tail.then(async () => { + const disk = await encoded; await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(this.file), { recursive: true }); const temporary = this.file + '.' + randomUUID() + '.tmp'; try { await fs.writeFile(temporary, JSON.stringify(disk), { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' }); await fs.rename(temporary, this.file); } diff --git a/lib/online-backup-keyring.js b/lib/online-backup-keyring.js index b97fdb6..8fceec8 100644 --- a/lib/online-backup-keyring.js +++ b/lib/online-backup-keyring.js @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ return canonicalJson({ generation: document.generation, keys: document.keys }); } - function validateEntry(entry) { + async function validateEntry(entry) { const hasLegacyShape = hasExactKeys(entry, STORED_LEGACY_ENTRY_KEYS); const hasIpShape = hasExactKeys(entry, STORED_IP_ENTRY_KEYS); const hasExpiringShape = hasExactKeys(entry, STORED_EXPIRING_ENTRY_KEYS) || hasIpShape; @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ } let key; try { - key = decryptField(entry.encryptedKey); + key = await decryptField(entry.encryptedKey); } catch (error) { return { issue: decryptionIssue(error), id: entry.id }; } @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ }; } - function inspectSource(source) { + async function inspectSource(source) { const idCounts = new Map(); for (const entry of source.document.keys) { if (isCanonicalId(entry?.id)) idCounts.set(entry.id, (idCounts.get(entry.id) || 0) + 1); @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ const problems = []; for (const entry of source.document.keys) { if (duplicateIds.has(entry?.id)) continue; - const result = validateEntry(entry); + const result = await validateEntry(entry); if (result.entry) entries.push(result.entry); else problems.push({ code: result.issue, id: result.id }); } @@ -307,12 +307,12 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ modified = (await fsImpl.stat(candidatePath)).mtimeMs; } catch {} } - states.push(inspectSource({ ...candidate, modified, recovered: candidatePath !== filePath })); + states.push(await inspectSource({ ...candidate, modified, recovered: candidatePath !== filePath })); } if (states.length === 0) { if (observedCandidate) throw issueError(KEYRING_ERROR_CODES.structure); const document = { version: 1, generation: 0, keys: [] }; - return inspectSource({ + return await inspectSource({ status: 'valid', path: filePath, contents: JSON.stringify({ version: 1, keys: [] }), @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ async function validateStaging(stagingPath, generation, payload) { const candidate = await readCandidate(stagingPath); if (candidate.status !== 'valid') throw issueError(KEYRING_ERROR_CODES.structure); - const state = inspectSource({ ...candidate, recovered: false }); + const state = await inspectSource({ ...candidate, recovered: false }); const blockingIssue = firstBlockingIssue(state); if (blockingIssue) throw issueError(blockingIssue); if (state.generation !== generation || state.payload !== payload) throw issueError(KEYRING_ERROR_CODES.structure); @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ }); } - function prepare(key, createdAt, expiresAt = null) { + async function prepare(key, createdAt, expiresAt = null) { let parsed; try { parsed = parseKey(key); @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ } let encryptedKey; try { - encryptedKey = encryptField(key); + encryptedKey = await encryptField(key); } catch (error) { throw encryptionError(error); } @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupKeyring({ function commit(entry) { return serialize(async () => { - const validated = validateEntry(entry); + const validated = await validateEntry(entry); if (!validated.entry) throw issueError(validated.issue); const state = await readState(); const blockingIssue = firstBlockingIssue(state); diff --git a/lib/online-backup-manager.js b/lib/online-backup-manager.js index cafddcf..a7b6b9a 100644 --- a/lib/online-backup-manager.js +++ b/lib/online-backup-manager.js @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ function createOnlineBackupManager({ const settings = await loadSettings(); const recoveryPublicKey = await loadRecoveryPublicKey(); const created = createBackup(settings, appVersion(), createdAt, retention, recoveryPublicKey); - let prepared = keyring.prepare(created.key, createdAt, created.expiresAt ?? null); + let prepared = await keyring.prepare(created.key, createdAt, created.expiresAt ?? null); const metadata = await uploadBackup(created.record); if (metadata?.sourceIp) prepared = Object.freeze({ ...prepared, sourceIp: metadata.sourceIp }); try { diff --git a/lib/secret-store.js b/lib/secret-store.js index 5597a62..8015e1a 100644 --- a/lib/secret-store.js +++ b/lib/secret-store.js @@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ class SecretStoreError extends Error { } let _safeStorageCache = undefined; -function getSafeStorage() { +async function getSafeStorage() { if (_safeStorageCache !== undefined) return _safeStorageCache; try { const { safeStorage } = require('electron'); - if (safeStorage && typeof safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable === 'function' - && safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable()) { + if (safeStorage && typeof safeStorage.isAsyncEncryptionAvailable === 'function' + && await safeStorage.isAsyncEncryptionAvailable()) { _safeStorageCache = safeStorage; return _safeStorageCache; } @@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ function getSafeStorage() { return null; } +function unavailableError() { + return new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_UNAVAILABLE', 'Sicherer Zugangsdaten-Speicher ist nicht verfügbar'); +} + +function decryptFailedError(cause) { + return new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_DECRYPT_FAILED', 'Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten konnten nicht entschlüsselt werden', cause); +} + function isEncrypted(value) { if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value.startsWith(SENTINEL)) return false; const encoded = value.slice(SENTINEL.length); @@ -41,68 +49,88 @@ function isEncrypted(value) { return decoded.length > 0 && decoded.toString('base64') === encoded; } -function encryptField(value) { +async function encryptField(value) { if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return value; if (isEncrypted(value)) return value; - const ss = getSafeStorage(); - if (!ss) { - throw new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_UNAVAILABLE', 'Sicherer Zugangsdaten-Speicher ist nicht verfügbar'); - } + const ss = await getSafeStorage(); + if (!ss) throw unavailableError(); try { - const buf = ss.encryptString(value); - return SENTINEL + buf.toString('base64'); + const buf = await ss.encryptStringAsync(value); + return SENTINEL + Buffer.from(buf).toString('base64'); } catch (cause) { throw new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_ENCRYPT_FAILED', 'Zugangsdaten konnten nicht sicher verschlüsselt werden', cause); } } -function decryptField(value) { - if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return value; +async function decryptFieldWithStatus(value) { + if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return { value, shouldReEncrypt: false }; if (!isEncrypted(value)) { - if (value.startsWith(SENTINEL)) { - throw new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_DECRYPT_FAILED', 'Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten konnten nicht entschlüsselt werden'); - } - return value; - } - const ss = getSafeStorage(); - if (!ss) { - throw new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_UNAVAILABLE', 'Sicherer Zugangsdaten-Speicher ist nicht verfügbar'); + if (value.startsWith(SENTINEL)) throw decryptFailedError(); + return { value, shouldReEncrypt: false }; } + const ss = await getSafeStorage(); + if (!ss) throw unavailableError(); + let decrypted; try { - const buf = Buffer.from(value.slice(SENTINEL.length), 'base64'); - return ss.decryptString(buf); + decrypted = await ss.decryptStringAsync(Buffer.from(value.slice(SENTINEL.length), 'base64')); } catch (cause) { - throw new SecretStoreError('SECRET_STORE_DECRYPT_FAILED', 'Gespeicherte Zugangsdaten konnten nicht entschlüsselt werden', cause); + throw decryptFailedError(cause); } + if (!decrypted || typeof decrypted.result !== 'string') throw decryptFailedError(); + return { value: decrypted.result, shouldReEncrypt: decrypted.shouldReEncrypt === true }; } -function mapHosterAccounts(config, fn) { - if (config?.globalSettings?.cloudLogSync?.apiKey) { - config.globalSettings.cloudLogSync.apiKey = fn(config.globalSettings.cloudLogSync.apiKey); - } - if (!config || !config.hosters || typeof config.hosters !== 'object') return config; +async function decryptField(value) { + return (await decryptFieldWithStatus(value)).value; +} + +function credentialSlots(config) { + const slots = []; + const cloudLogSync = config?.globalSettings?.cloudLogSync; + if (cloudLogSync?.apiKey) slots.push([cloudLogSync, 'apiKey']); + if (!config || !config.hosters || typeof config.hosters !== 'object') return slots; for (const accounts of Object.values(config.hosters)) { if (!Array.isArray(accounts)) continue; for (const acc of accounts) { if (!acc || typeof acc !== 'object') continue; for (const f of CRED_FIELDS) { - if (acc[f]) acc[f] = fn(acc[f]); + if (acc[f]) slots.push([acc, f]); } } } + return slots; +} + +async function mapHosterAccounts(config, fn) { + for (const [owner, field] of credentialSlots(config)) owner[field] = await fn(owner[field]); return config; } -function encryptCredentials(config) { +function hasEncryptedCredentials(config) { + return credentialSlots(config).some(([owner, field]) => typeof owner[field] === 'string' && owner[field].startsWith(SENTINEL)); +} + +async function encryptCredentials(config) { return mapHosterAccounts(config, encryptField); } -function decryptCredentials(config) { return mapHosterAccounts(config, decryptField); } + +async function decryptCredentials(config) { + let shouldReEncrypt = false; + await mapHosterAccounts(config, async value => { + const decrypted = await decryptFieldWithStatus(value); + if (decrypted.shouldReEncrypt) shouldReEncrypt = true; + return decrypted.value; + }); + return { config, shouldReEncrypt }; +} module.exports = { SecretStoreError, encryptField, decryptField, + decryptFieldWithStatus, encryptCredentials, decryptCredentials, + hasEncryptedCredentials, isEncrypted }; diff --git a/main.js b/main.js index caa89d7..da89243 100644 --- a/main.js +++ b/main.js @@ -2010,6 +2010,7 @@ async function runAutomaticUpdateCheck(forceRefresh) { app.whenReady().then(async () => { await mcpUpdate.load().catch(() => logError('MCP update state unavailable')); if (!_hasSingleInstanceLock) return; + await configStore.init().catch(error => logError(`config load failed: ${error?.code || error?.message || error}`)); startupDiagnostics.write('application-ready', { hardwareAcceleration: app.isHardwareAccelerationEnabled(), gpuFeatures: app.getGPUFeatureStatus() }); void app.getGPUInfo('basic').then(info => { const devices = Array.isArray(info.gpuDevice) ? info.gpuDevice.map(device => ({ From 3c7ce614a19893b004787a75f5f0f51c0ca55ba5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 08:45:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/20] Release 2.1.86 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 631f83f..68bf10a 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.85", + "version": "2.1.86", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.85", + "version": "2.1.86", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index ee6c04e..ccd6054 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.85", + "version": "2.1.86", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": { From 23fc22fd7d2e55e1e9354f5e0f2c87e0ec8d0c1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 17:25:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/20] Ignore staged source deletions in folder automation Deleting a source after a successful upload first renames it to ..mhu-delete- and then unlinks it. On a slow disk the unlink can take several seconds. With an empty extension filter the folder watcher and the reconcile scan reported the staged file as a new file, so the automation queued and uploaded it again until the unlink removed it. The jobs for the vanished staged file were then restarted by every automatic start and skipped with "Datei nicht gefunden". - source-cleanup-policy: shared stagedSourceName/isStagedSourceFile. - folder-monitor and file-discovery skip staged delete files. - Automatic starts no longer restart queue jobs that point at a staged delete file; manual starts are unchanged. - An ENOENT while unlinking the staged file counts as deleted instead of a failed unlink with a restore attempt. EBUSY/EPERM keep their retries and stay visible as failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/file-discovery.js | 3 ++- lib/folder-monitor.js | 3 +++ lib/source-cleanup-policy.js | 14 +++++++++++++- lib/source-file-cleanup.js | 5 ++++- renderer/app.js | 1 + 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/file-discovery.js b/lib/file-discovery.js index 0e6482d..2f7e8d0 100644 --- a/lib/file-discovery.js +++ b/lib/file-discovery.js @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); +const { isStagedSourceFile } = require('./source-cleanup-policy'); async function walkFolderAsync(rootDir, options = {}) { const fsPromises = options.fsPromises || fs.promises; @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ async function walkFolderAsync(rootDir, options = {}) { const fullPath = pathImpl.join(dir, entry.name); if (entry.isDirectory()) { if (recursive) stack.push(fullPath); - } else if (entry.isFile()) { + } else if (entry.isFile() && !isStagedSourceFile(entry.name)) { let size = 0; try { size = (await fsPromises.stat(fullPath)).size; diff --git a/lib/folder-monitor.js b/lib/folder-monitor.js index ff9051c..d6f4c73 100644 --- a/lib/folder-monitor.js +++ b/lib/folder-monitor.js @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const path = require('path'); const chokidar = require('chokidar'); const { walkFolderAsync } = require('./file-discovery'); const { normalizeAutomationSettings } = require('./automation-control'); +const { isStagedSourceFile } = require('./source-cleanup-policy'); class FolderMonitor extends EventEmitter { constructor({ @@ -267,6 +268,7 @@ class FolderMonitor extends EventEmitter { _onNewFile(filePath, generation) { if (!this._acceptCallback(generation)) return; + if (isStagedSourceFile(filePath)) return; if (!this._classifyPath(filePath, this._settings).allowed) return; const normalized = this._normalizePath(filePath); const ownsSeenReservation = !!this._settings?.skipDuplicates && !this._seenFiles.has(normalized); @@ -381,6 +383,7 @@ class FolderMonitor extends EventEmitter { for (const descriptor of discovered) { if (!this._isCurrent(generation)) return []; if (!settings.recursive && this._isNestedPath(descriptor.path, settings.folderPath)) continue; + if (isStagedSourceFile(descriptor.path)) continue; const classification = this._classifyPath(descriptor.path, settings); let mtimeMs = 0; try { diff --git a/lib/source-cleanup-policy.js b/lib/source-cleanup-policy.js index b97f3fd..06cfcf2 100644 --- a/lib/source-cleanup-policy.js +++ b/lib/source-cleanup-policy.js @@ -3,6 +3,16 @@ const pathApi = typeof require === 'function' ? require('path') : null; const protectedStatuses = new Set(['done', 'error', 'aborted', 'skipped']); + const stagedSourcePattern = /^\..+\.mhu-delete-[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i; + + function stagedSourceName(fileName, id) { + return `.${fileName}.mhu-delete-${id}`; + } + + function isStagedSourceFile(file) { + if (typeof file !== 'string' || !file) return false; + return stagedSourcePattern.test(file.split(/[\\/]/).pop()); + } function normalizeFile(file, platform) { const value = typeof file === 'string' ? file.trim() : ''; @@ -212,7 +222,9 @@ prepareGroups, markCompleted, removeRequirement, - applyFingerprints + applyFingerprints, + stagedSourceName, + isStagedSourceFile }; if (typeof module !== 'undefined' && module.exports) { diff --git a/lib/source-file-cleanup.js b/lib/source-file-cleanup.js index 72db854..6801a3a 100644 --- a/lib/source-file-cleanup.js +++ b/lib/source-file-cleanup.js @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ const RETRY_DELAYS = [100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000]; const TERMINAL_STATUSES = new Set(['done', 'error', 'aborted', 'skipped', 'failed', 'missing-account']); const crypto = require('node:crypto'); +const { stagedSourceName } = require('./source-cleanup-policy'); function createSourceFileCleanup(options) { if (!options || !options.fs || !options.path) { @@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ function createSourceFileCleanup(options) { await fs.promises.unlink(file); return { attempts }; } catch (error) { + if (error && error.code === 'ENOENT') return { attempts, alreadyRemoved: true }; const retryable = platform === 'win32' && error && (error.code === 'EBUSY' || error.code === 'EPERM'); if (!retryable || attempts > RETRY_DELAYS.length) throw Object.assign(error, { cleanupAttempts: attempts }); await wait(RETRY_DELAYS[attempts - 1]); @@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ function createSourceFileCleanup(options) { async function stageSource(manifest) { const stagedFile = path.join( path.dirname(manifest.file), - `.${path.basename(manifest.file)}.mhu-delete-${crypto.randomUUID()}` + stagedSourceName(path.basename(manifest.file), crypto.randomUUID()) ); if (!journal || typeof journal.plan !== 'function') { return { outcome: 'blocked', trigger: 'delete-journal-unavailable' }; @@ -464,6 +466,7 @@ function createSourceFileCleanup(options) { await emitAudit(manifest, 'deleted', { trigger: 'all-selected-hosters-succeeded', attempts: result.attempts, + ...(result.alreadyRemoved ? { alreadyRemoved: true } : {}), ...scope }); return 'deleted'; diff --git a/renderer/app.js b/renderer/app.js index 2b56f66..9c1e46d 100644 --- a/renderer/app.js +++ b/renderer/app.js @@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ function isStartableQueueJob(job) { function isAutomaticallyStartableQueueJob(job) { if (!isStartableQueueJob(job)) return false; + if (window.SourceCleanupPolicy?.isStagedSourceFile(job.file || job.fileName)) return false; if (job.status !== 'error' || !window.Stats) return true; return window.Stats.classifyErrorCategory(job.error) !== 'file-rejected'; } From abc801e60c5f88fd8ddf60905eda166715ecb666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 17:37:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 19/20] Retry DoodStream upload-page server errors as transient A single HTTP 500 from the DoodStream upload page while resolving the upload session was reported as "sess_id nicht gefunden nach Login". That message matched the session cooldown pattern, so the job failed at once without a retry and the account was paused. - 5xx and 408 answers of the upload page throw "DoodStream: Upload-Seite antwortete mit HTTP " flagged transientNetwork. The existing upload-manager loop retries on the same account up to the configured retries and does not pause the account. - Other non-200 answers name the status and keep the session renewal path (account cooldown, new login). - HTTP 200 without sess_id keeps the session error. - English translation for the new message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/doodstream-upload.js | 6 ++++++ renderer/i18n.js | 1 + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/doodstream-upload.js b/lib/doodstream-upload.js index ec03055..d362b87 100644 --- a/lib/doodstream-upload.js +++ b/lib/doodstream-upload.js @@ -232,6 +232,12 @@ class DoodstreamUploader { this.sessId = ''; const guest = /utype\s*:\s*['"]anon['"]/.test(html); _debugLog(`session-missing HTTP=${res.status} guest=${guest} cookies=${this.cookies.size}`, true); + if (res.status !== 200) { + const error = new Error(`DoodStream: Upload-Seite antwortete mit HTTP ${res.status}`); + if (res.status >= 500 || res.status === 408) error.transientNetwork = true; + else error.accountError = true; + throw error; + } throw new Error('Doodstream: sess_id nicht gefunden nach Login'); } diff --git a/renderer/i18n.js b/renderer/i18n.js index 0017178..ae24070 100644 --- a/renderer/i18n.js +++ b/renderer/i18n.js @@ -988,6 +988,7 @@ [/^Clouddrop: Datei nicht lesbar: (.+)$/, 'Clouddrop: File cannot be read: $1'], [/^Doodstream: konnte Upload-Server nicht ermitteln \(Endpoint geändert\?\)\. (.+)$/, 'Doodstream: Could not determine the upload server (endpoint changed?). $1'], [/^Doodstream Upload fehlgeschlagen: (.+)$/, 'Doodstream upload failed: $1'], + [/^DoodStream: Upload-Seite antwortete mit HTTP (\d{3})$/, 'DoodStream: The upload page responded with HTTP $1'], [/^Doodstream Upload: kein Filecode — Server gab leeren Link zurück (.+)$/, 'Doodstream upload: No file code — the server returned an empty link $1'], [/^Doodstream lehnt Datei ab \(Server-Status: (.+)\)\. CDN=(.+)$/, 'Doodstream rejected the file (server status: $1). CDN=$2'], [/^Doodstream Upload: Redirect-Antwort ungültig \((.+)\)$/, 'Doodstream upload: Invalid redirect response ($1)'], From 3ed2f7fe84500b9ecc8ff28e24ecfb6ebe158a13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sucukdeluxe <259325684+Sucukdeluxe@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 17:37:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 20/20] Release 2.1.87 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- package-lock.json | 4 ++-- package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 68bf10a..acfac42 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.86", + "version": "2.1.87", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.86", + "version": "2.1.87", "dependencies": { "chokidar": "^4.0.3", "undici": "7.29.1", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index ccd6054..4bbb290 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "multi-hoster-uploader", - "version": "2.1.86", + "version": "2.1.87", "description": "Upload files to doodstream, voe, vidmoly, byse simultaneously", "main": "main.js", "scripts": {