Repo-side hardening and tooling from the intensive test round (none of this ships
in the app installer).
- gateway: registry.json (holds bearer tokens) now gets a best-effort owner-only
NTFS ACL on Windows via `icacls /inheritance:r /grant:r <user>:F` (the chmod
0600 is a no-op on NTFS); verified the file ends up <user>:(F) only.
- gateway: connect_server now reads the app version from the real get_system_info
shape (data.app.version / data.agent.version), so "connected to vX.Y.Z" works.
- gateway: read_log tool description documents grep as a case-insensitive substring
filter with "|" alternation (not a regex), matching the agent-side change.
- gateway: standalone verification harnesses moved to gateway/verify/ (so
`node --test` only sweeps real unit tests) and exposed via `npm run verify`:
e2e-verify, integration-mcp (live gateway-MCP <-> agent, all 14 tools), and
adversarial-probe (redaction fuzz + ReDoS + lockout). `npm test` runs the units.
- eslint: gateway/** now lints as ESM (sourceType module) via a dedicated block;
global ignores fixed so `eslint .` is clean across the whole project (0 errors).
- docs/remote-diagnostics-setup.md: made the transport story honest — the agent
speaks plaintext ws:// over enforced loopback; the SSH/WireGuard tunnel is the
ONLY confidentiality layer (wss/TLS + cert-pin is a documented future mode, not
active). Removed the stale "bind to a LAN/VPN IP" guidance (loopback is enforced).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the connect-by-code side of remote diagnostics and closes two real
secret-leak vectors that an end-to-end gateway<->agent test surfaced.
Gateway (gateway/, local stdio MCP, Claude connects once):
- 14 read-only tools (server_health hub, read_log, list_logs, list_errors,
get_queue_state, get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info,
get_rotation_state, get_app_events + connect/disconnect/list/current).
- The HOST is always supplied by the operator, never taken from the code.
- TLS fingerprint pinning is enforced in the socket 'open' handler BEFORE the
token is sent (wss opt-in); plain ws is loopback-only.
- registry.json (holds bearer tokens) is gitignored; only an empty example ships.
Security hardening (gates every off-box payload):
- redactLogText now scrubs opaque bearer/token-family secrets that are NOT
stored config credentials (e.g. a session token a hoster returns inside an
error string): bare token/auth_token/refresh_token/session_token + standalone
"Bearer <opaque>". Benign "token bucket" prose is left intact.
- get_config_redacted deep-redacts every string leaf (JSON-safe, per-leaf, so
the cookie/sess line patterns can't gobble across a compact-JSON field) and
drops the history subtree (served by get_history with its own per-error
redaction). This plugs leaks via globalSettings.pendingQueue[].error etc.
Bind-address safety:
- _safeDiagBindAddress() forces the diagnostic agent to 127.0.0.1/::1; the
0.0.0.0 UI option is removed. Direct LAN/Internet bind stays disabled until
encrypted transport (wss) exists — remote access goes through an SSH/VPN
tunnel to loopback. (Never plaintext ws:// on all interfaces.)
Tests: end-to-end gateway<->agent gate (connect -> server_health/read_log/
get_config_redacted, asserts zero secret leakage, rejects doodstream log, path
traversal and write ops); + redaction regression tests in the main suite.
385 app tests + 9 gateway tests pass; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
