Intensive end-to-end testing (a live gateway-MCP <-> agent integration harness +
an adversarial redaction/abuse probe + an independent security audit) surfaced
three real issues in the shipped read-only diagnostic agent. All run in lib/**,
which is packaged in the app.
1. grep ReDoS froze the Electron main process. read_log compiled the
client-supplied grep into `new RegExp(grep, 'i')` and ran it synchronously over
the log tail IN the main process. A catastrophic pattern (e.g. "(a+)+$" against
a long line) hangs the whole app — empirically confirmed (8s timeout, killed).
JS regex is synchronous and uncancellable, so grep is now a case-insensitive
literal substring filter with "|" alternation ("error|timeout|502"). Provably
linear-time; covers the real diagnostic need.
2. Prototype-chain whitelist bypass. The op table was a plain object literal, so
handle("constructor" | "toString" | "valueOf", ...) resolved an inherited
Object.prototype function, passed the `typeof fn === 'function'` guard and
returned {ok:true}. Harmless functions today, but a whitelist-integrity hole.
Now guarded with a string check + Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.
3. Redaction defense-in-depth gaps. redactLogText now also scrubs: basic-auth URL
passwords (scheme://user:pass@host), Authorization: Basic, JWTs (eyJ...x.y.z),
and bare/JSON session= values. Mostly theoretical in today's readable logs
(secret-bearing bodies go to the excluded doodstream-debug.log; other hosters
throw static strings) but matters as the verbose-logging surface grows.
Verified: 383 app tests (incl. new regression tests for all three), the live
gateway-MCP integration harness (all 14 tools, zero leaks, error paths), the
adversarial probe (14/14+ secret shapes scrubbed, ReDoS 1ms, lockout, malformed
args), e2e gate, lint 0 errors. Only residual: a standalone high-entropy blob with
zero key/Bearer/URL context — inherent to any denylist, acknowledged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
registry.json holds each server's bearer token (the connection secret). It was
written with the process default umask, leaving it group/world-readable on POSIX
multi-user hosts. Write with mode 0o600 and chmod the existing file (writeFile
only applies mode on creation). No-op on Windows (NTFS uses ACLs, and the file
already sits under the user profile and is gitignored), effective on Linux/macOS
where the gateway may run.
Gateway-only change — not part of the app installer or auto-updater, so no
version bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
get_queue_state with includeJobs:true (the DEFAULT path) scrubbed the job list
with value-scrub only, so an opaque token a hoster returns inside a job error
(token=... that is NOT one of the user's stored credentials) survived in the
response. Same leak class already fixed for get_config_redacted and
server_health, still open on the queue collector's default path.
The first end-to-end gate missed it on two coincidences: server_health calls
getQueueState with includeJobs:false (no job error ever serialized), and the
fixture's queue error used a value that WAS a config secret (so value-scrub
caught it anyway). The direct get_queue_state{includeJobs:true} path with a
non-config token was never exercised.
- getQueueState job list and getRotationState now go through _deepRedact
(per-leaf pattern + value scrub), matching the other collectors.
- e2e-verify.mjs now plants a non-config token in a queue job error and asserts
both get_queue_state{includeJobs:true} and the default-args call leak nothing.
- Added a main-suite regression test for the default includeJobs path.
386 app tests + 9 gateway tests + e2e gate pass; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the connect-by-code side of remote diagnostics and closes two real
secret-leak vectors that an end-to-end gateway<->agent test surfaced.
Gateway (gateway/, local stdio MCP, Claude connects once):
- 14 read-only tools (server_health hub, read_log, list_logs, list_errors,
get_queue_state, get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info,
get_rotation_state, get_app_events + connect/disconnect/list/current).
- The HOST is always supplied by the operator, never taken from the code.
- TLS fingerprint pinning is enforced in the socket 'open' handler BEFORE the
token is sent (wss opt-in); plain ws is loopback-only.
- registry.json (holds bearer tokens) is gitignored; only an empty example ships.
Security hardening (gates every off-box payload):
- redactLogText now scrubs opaque bearer/token-family secrets that are NOT
stored config credentials (e.g. a session token a hoster returns inside an
error string): bare token/auth_token/refresh_token/session_token + standalone
"Bearer <opaque>". Benign "token bucket" prose is left intact.
- get_config_redacted deep-redacts every string leaf (JSON-safe, per-leaf, so
the cookie/sess line patterns can't gobble across a compact-JSON field) and
drops the history subtree (served by get_history with its own per-error
redaction). This plugs leaks via globalSettings.pendingQueue[].error etc.
Bind-address safety:
- _safeDiagBindAddress() forces the diagnostic agent to 127.0.0.1/::1; the
0.0.0.0 UI option is removed. Direct LAN/Internet bind stays disabled until
encrypted transport (wss) exists — remote access goes through an SSH/VPN
tunnel to loopback. (Never plaintext ws:// on all interfaces.)
Tests: end-to-end gateway<->agent gate (connect -> server_health/read_log/
get_config_redacted, asserts zero secret leakage, rejects doodstream log, path
traversal and write ops); + redaction regression tests in the main suite.
385 app tests + 9 gateway tests pass; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
