registry.json holds each server's bearer token (the connection secret). It was
written with the process default umask, leaving it group/world-readable on POSIX
multi-user hosts. Write with mode 0o600 and chmod the existing file (writeFile
only applies mode on creation). No-op on Windows (NTFS uses ACLs, and the file
already sits under the user profile and is gitignored), effective on Linux/macOS
where the gateway may run.
Gateway-only change — not part of the app installer or auto-updater, so no
version bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the connect-by-code side of remote diagnostics and closes two real
secret-leak vectors that an end-to-end gateway<->agent test surfaced.
Gateway (gateway/, local stdio MCP, Claude connects once):
- 14 read-only tools (server_health hub, read_log, list_logs, list_errors,
get_queue_state, get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info,
get_rotation_state, get_app_events + connect/disconnect/list/current).
- The HOST is always supplied by the operator, never taken from the code.
- TLS fingerprint pinning is enforced in the socket 'open' handler BEFORE the
token is sent (wss opt-in); plain ws is loopback-only.
- registry.json (holds bearer tokens) is gitignored; only an empty example ships.
Security hardening (gates every off-box payload):
- redactLogText now scrubs opaque bearer/token-family secrets that are NOT
stored config credentials (e.g. a session token a hoster returns inside an
error string): bare token/auth_token/refresh_token/session_token + standalone
"Bearer <opaque>". Benign "token bucket" prose is left intact.
- get_config_redacted deep-redacts every string leaf (JSON-safe, per-leaf, so
the cookie/sess line patterns can't gobble across a compact-JSON field) and
drops the history subtree (served by get_history with its own per-error
redaction). This plugs leaks via globalSettings.pendingQueue[].error etc.
Bind-address safety:
- _safeDiagBindAddress() forces the diagnostic agent to 127.0.0.1/::1; the
0.0.0.0 UI option is removed. Direct LAN/Internet bind stays disabled until
encrypted transport (wss) exists — remote access goes through an SSH/VPN
tunnel to loopback. (Never plaintext ws:// on all interfaces.)
Tests: end-to-end gateway<->agent gate (connect -> server_health/read_log/
get_config_redacted, asserts zero secret leakage, rejects doodstream log, path
traversal and write ops); + redaction regression tests in the main suite.
385 app tests + 9 gateway tests pass; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
