User asked to measure everything so we can pinpoint the lag/ECONNRESET at 70 concurrent uploads. All additive instrumentation, no upload-behavior change.
main process: the eventloop-delay log line now also reports cpu=X%core (process.cpuUsage delta over wall time; >100% means multiple cores), rss, per-hoster live connection distribution (active-by-hoster), cumulative transient (ECONNRESET-class) error count, and pending count — pulled from a new UploadManager.getDiagnostics(). This shows whether the main thread is CPU-bound and which hoster is oversubscribed.
renderer: a PerformanceObserver('longtask') plus a requestAnimationFrame frame-time monitor log 'renderer-perf' every 5s while uploading — fps, jankFrames (>33ms), worstFrame, longtask count and max. This is the direct renderer ground truth (real frame rate under load), which the component-timing harness could not capture. Low fps / high jank => renderer is blocked; ~60fps while it still feels laggy => the cpu/eld numbers in the same log decide CPU-bound vs IO-bound in the main process.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rotation-retry and suspect-alternate progressCb callbacks called _emitProgress (a synchronous EventEmitter emit plus a fresh object spread) on every stream chunk — hundreds per second per job — because they lacked the 250 ms lastEmitTime gate the primary upload path already has. With many concurrent uploads in rotation or suspect mode that is real main-thread emit amplification.
Mirror the primary path's gate exactly: the activeEntry speed/bytes mutation stays ungated so the stats timer and speed monitor keep seeing fresh values; only the _emitProgress call is throttled to ~4/sec. Behavior-preserving — identical progress data, fewer emits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
_uploadChunked read each 16 MB chunk with fs.readSync on the main JS thread — the only one of the five uploaders that blocks synchronously (the other four stream async). Each readSync stalls the whole event loop ~5-9 ms on SSD, 30-100 ms on a slow disk, freezing all progress emits, IPC, renders and every other concurrent upload for that window. The stall scales with the number of simultaneous clouddrop uploads, matching the 'feels laggy while uploading, worse with more at once' symptom at modest CPU (one core pinned, ~40% of 8).
Swap fs.openSync/readSync/closeSync for fs.promises.open + await fh.read + await fh.close. Buffer reuse and the partial-last-chunk subarray view are unchanged. Verified byte-identical to the old loop via SHA-256 over every chunk-boundary case (full chunk, partial last chunk, 2/3/4-chunk files, single byte) before shipping — a chunk-read bug would corrupt the upload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two isolated hardenings of the opt-in remote/diagnostics WS server, surfaced by
the session-wide diagnostics audit:
1. WebSocketServer was created with no maxPayload, so ws defaults to 100 MiB per
message. The connection handler runs JSON.parse(raw) on the FIRST message
(the auth frame) before authentication, so any peer past the IP allowlist
could send a huge payload and force a synchronous multi-MB JSON.parse on the
main-process event loop — an unbounded freeze/DoS sink. Diag, auth and WebRTC
signaling messages are all small; cap maxPayload at 256 KiB to close it.
2. sendToClient did ws.send(JSON.stringify(data)) with no readyState/try guard
(unlike broadcast, which checks ws.readyState === 1). A send on a closing
socket, or a stringify throw, escaped the diag-response callback as an
uncaughtException — a potential crash. Mirror broadcast: send only when
readyState === 1, wrapped in try/catch.
Both are isolated to the transport layer with zero redaction surface. The audit's
larger finding — server_health doing O(historySize) synchronous work per request
(6-7 full-config clones + unbounded history walks) — is a real freeze, but ONLY on
the cold opt-in diagnostics path with a large history (this user: 23 rows), and the
safe fix cuts into the credential-redaction collectors (which have leaked twice);
deferred and documented in tasks/todo.md rather than operated under risk.
397/397 tests pass, eslint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
doodstream-upload.js's _debugLog ran with NO verbose gate: every call did a
synchronous statSync (via maybeRotateLogFile) + appendFileSync directly on the
main-process event loop, ~8-15x per upload (server probe, response, redirect,
result page, filecode parse, hidden fields, submit/follow, plus retry branches).
DoodstreamUploader runs in the main process, so each pair of sync fs syscalls
blocked the event loop while uploading — delaying IPC, upload-progress-batch
forwarding, tray-tooltip and webhook handling for every other concurrent upload.
A constant per-upload main-thread tax (not history-scaling), surfaced by the
session-wide lag audit and confirmed as the one finding that bites in the real
upload scenario.
Fix: gate _debugLog behind the existing globalSettings.logVerbose setting
(default false), exactly mirroring main.js logDebug/_logVerbose. A module-level
_debugVerbose flag + setDebugVerbose() setter, an early-return at the top of
_debugLog, and one wire at main.js's single setLogVerbose chokepoint (covers
boot + save-config + the verbose toggle). When verbose is off the doodstream
trace simply isn't written — same contract as the main debug.log — and the
per-upload sync fs disappears. When a doodstream issue needs tracing, enabling
verbose restores the full trace.
The config-store audit findings (load() history-clone cost, per-write history
serialize) are real but scale only with history size — tens of microseconds at
this user's 8-batch config, and the safe fix is risky persistence surgery on
credential-bearing code for a latent micro-cost; deferred and documented in
tasks/todo.md rather than shipped.
397/397 tests pass, eslint clean, gate wiring verified (shared module instance,
default-off, toggles).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A 13-agent hunt pinned the "wird mit der Zeit laggy" symptom (CPU/RAM normal, UI
sluggish after many uploads) to the main process re-doing config I/O that scales
with the ever-growing history, stalling the synchronous main event loop so the
renderer's IPC round-trips feel laggy. The renderer render path was already
optimized (virtualized queue, capped panels) — confirmed clean.
This commit lands the two contained fixes (T1 + T3); the queue-persist rewrite (T2)
follows separately.
config-store (T1):
- load() now has an in-memory cache keyed on the file mtime+size. The processed
config (merged + credential-decrypted) is re-read/re-parsed/re-DPAPI-decrypted
ONLY when the file actually changes; our writes invalidate it, external edits
change mtime/size so the cache misses. Eliminates a full disk read + JSON.parse of
the whole growing history + per-credential decrypt on the vast majority of the ~38
load() call sites. load() always returns a structuredClone so callers can mutate
freely without corrupting the cache.
- _serializeForDisk clones ONLY the hosters subtree (the only thing encryptCredentials
touches) instead of JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(whole config)) — no more deep-cloning
an 8 MB history on every write.
- _atomicWrite refreshes the .bak with a raw fs.copyFileSync instead of
read + JSON.parse + write (it was re-parsing the full config a 2nd time per write).
main.js (T3):
- The log-flush paths resolved the log file via configStore.load() ~8x/second during
uploads (re-reading + cloning the whole config just to read logMode/logFilePath).
Cache those two strings in module scope, invalidate on the settings-save handlers.
Verified: 26 config-store tests (incl. new cache-correctness: independent clones,
external-change invalidation, save invalidation) + full 394-test suite green, lint 0
errors. Benchmark (8000-batch / 4.6 MB history): log flush no longer calls load() at
all; the remaining per-write history serialize is what T2 removes from the hot path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matches the Real-Debrid-Downloader's rd-diagnostics-mcp model so the read-only
diagnostics agent is reachable over Tailscale (or any private tunnel) the same way
the downloader is, instead of requiring an SSH local-forward.
- lib/ip-allowlist.js (NEW): fail-closed IP allowlist — normalizeIp strips
::ffff:, loopback is always allowed, an empty allowlist accepts loopback ONLY
(fail-closed), exact IP + CIDR (incl. the Tailscale CGNAT range 100.64.0.0/10) +
wildcard rules. The real socket peer IP is the authority (never a forwarded header).
- remote-server.js: rejects non-allowlisted peers at connection (close 4005). Opt-in
via config.allowlist (the existing remote-control server, which passes none, is
unaffected). Loopback always passes, so local + SSH-forward use keeps working.
- Two bind modes (config diagnostics.bindMode): "local" -> 127.0.0.1 (default),
"network" -> 0.0.0.0 but ONLY when a non-empty allowlist is set (else it stays
loopback, fail-closed). The allowlist + token gate access; the tunnel
(Tailscale/WireGuard) is the confidentiality layer (transport is still plaintext ws://).
- The connection code now carries the host: mhu1_<base64url{v,h,p,t,n,fp?,s?}>. The
gateway decode is tolerant of the legacy {port,token,label} keys; connect_server
takes the host from the code (host arg is an optional override). Proven end-to-end:
the integration harness now connects with NO host arg and resolves it from the code.
- Renderer: Sichtbarkeit selector (local/network), public-host input with
suggested-host chips (os.networkInterfaces — the Tailscale IP shows up there),
allowlist textarea (network mode), and network-requires-allowlist validation.
- main.js: bindMode->host, getSuggestedRemoteHosts, host-in-code, allowlist plumbed
into startDiagnosticAgent + the diagnostics IPC (get/save/status).
- docs: rewritten for Tailscale (set the allowlist to your tailnet, put the Tailscale
IP/MagicDNS in the code address — no SSH forward needed).
This supersedes the v3.3.85 hard loopback-lock with the downloader's allowlist model.
Tests: lib/ip-allowlist (8) + remote-server allowlist wiring/loopback (2) + gateway
decode (host short-key + legacy tolerance). 393 app tests + 9 gateway tests + e2e +
host-in-code integration + adversarial all green; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Intensive end-to-end testing (a live gateway-MCP <-> agent integration harness +
an adversarial redaction/abuse probe + an independent security audit) surfaced
three real issues in the shipped read-only diagnostic agent. All run in lib/**,
which is packaged in the app.
1. grep ReDoS froze the Electron main process. read_log compiled the
client-supplied grep into `new RegExp(grep, 'i')` and ran it synchronously over
the log tail IN the main process. A catastrophic pattern (e.g. "(a+)+$" against
a long line) hangs the whole app — empirically confirmed (8s timeout, killed).
JS regex is synchronous and uncancellable, so grep is now a case-insensitive
literal substring filter with "|" alternation ("error|timeout|502"). Provably
linear-time; covers the real diagnostic need.
2. Prototype-chain whitelist bypass. The op table was a plain object literal, so
handle("constructor" | "toString" | "valueOf", ...) resolved an inherited
Object.prototype function, passed the `typeof fn === 'function'` guard and
returned {ok:true}. Harmless functions today, but a whitelist-integrity hole.
Now guarded with a string check + Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.
3. Redaction defense-in-depth gaps. redactLogText now also scrubs: basic-auth URL
passwords (scheme://user:pass@host), Authorization: Basic, JWTs (eyJ...x.y.z),
and bare/JSON session= values. Mostly theoretical in today's readable logs
(secret-bearing bodies go to the excluded doodstream-debug.log; other hosters
throw static strings) but matters as the verbose-logging surface grows.
Verified: 383 app tests (incl. new regression tests for all three), the live
gateway-MCP integration harness (all 14 tools, zero leaks, error paths), the
adversarial probe (14/14+ secret shapes scrubbed, ReDoS 1ms, lockout, malformed
args), e2e gate, lint 0 errors. Only residual: a standalone high-entropy blob with
zero key/Bearer/URL context — inherent to any denylist, acknowledged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
get_queue_state with includeJobs:true (the DEFAULT path) scrubbed the job list
with value-scrub only, so an opaque token a hoster returns inside a job error
(token=... that is NOT one of the user's stored credentials) survived in the
response. Same leak class already fixed for get_config_redacted and
server_health, still open on the queue collector's default path.
The first end-to-end gate missed it on two coincidences: server_health calls
getQueueState with includeJobs:false (no job error ever serialized), and the
fixture's queue error used a value that WAS a config secret (so value-scrub
caught it anyway). The direct get_queue_state{includeJobs:true} path with a
non-config token was never exercised.
- getQueueState job list and getRotationState now go through _deepRedact
(per-leaf pattern + value scrub), matching the other collectors.
- e2e-verify.mjs now plants a non-config token in a queue job error and asserts
both get_queue_state{includeJobs:true} and the default-args call leak nothing.
- Added a main-suite regression test for the default includeJobs path.
386 app tests + 9 gateway tests + e2e gate pass; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the connect-by-code side of remote diagnostics and closes two real
secret-leak vectors that an end-to-end gateway<->agent test surfaced.
Gateway (gateway/, local stdio MCP, Claude connects once):
- 14 read-only tools (server_health hub, read_log, list_logs, list_errors,
get_queue_state, get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info,
get_rotation_state, get_app_events + connect/disconnect/list/current).
- The HOST is always supplied by the operator, never taken from the code.
- TLS fingerprint pinning is enforced in the socket 'open' handler BEFORE the
token is sent (wss opt-in); plain ws is loopback-only.
- registry.json (holds bearer tokens) is gitignored; only an empty example ships.
Security hardening (gates every off-box payload):
- redactLogText now scrubs opaque bearer/token-family secrets that are NOT
stored config credentials (e.g. a session token a hoster returns inside an
error string): bare token/auth_token/refresh_token/session_token + standalone
"Bearer <opaque>". Benign "token bucket" prose is left intact.
- get_config_redacted deep-redacts every string leaf (JSON-safe, per-leaf, so
the cookie/sess line patterns can't gobble across a compact-JSON field) and
drops the history subtree (served by get_history with its own per-error
redaction). This plugs leaks via globalSettings.pendingQueue[].error etc.
Bind-address safety:
- _safeDiagBindAddress() forces the diagnostic agent to 127.0.0.1/::1; the
0.0.0.0 UI option is removed. Direct LAN/Internet bind stays disabled until
encrypted transport (wss) exists — remote access goes through an SSH/VPN
tunnel to loopback. (Never plaintext ws:// on all interfaces.)
Tests: end-to-end gateway<->agent gate (connect -> server_health/read_log/
get_config_redacted, asserts zero secret leakage, rejects doodstream log, path
traversal and write ops); + redaction regression tests in the main suite.
385 app tests + 9 gateway tests pass; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the server/app half of a remote-diagnostics system so Claude (via a local
MCP gateway, added separately) can read a server's full state to diagnose
problems: logs, errors, queue/app state, redacted config, system health. All
read-only; security review folded in as hard requirements.
Architecture (design-verified):
- A SECOND, independent RemoteServer instance (diagnosticMode) on its own port
(default 9110, bind 127.0.0.1) with NO capture/input callbacks, so screen
capture and sendInputEvent are structurally unreachable from the diagnostic
path. The existing screen-share server (port 9100) is byte-for-byte unchanged.
- lib/remote-server.js: a `host` bind option, a post-auth `diag-request` branch
that delegates to onDiagnosticRequest and replies with a reqId-correlated
`diag-response`, a `diagnosticMode` guard (capture never spawns), a
timing-safe token compare (length-guarded), and getLastAccess().
- lib/diagnostics-agent.js: handle(op,args) enforces a HARDCODED read-only op
whitelist as the sole authority — no write/exec op, no run_health_check.
- lib/diagnostics-collectors.js: pure, dependency-injected collectors
(server_health one-shot hub, read_log, list_errors, get_queue_state,
get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info, list_logs, get_app_events,
get_rotation_state, get_health) reusing support-bundle + stats.
Security (all mandatory, implemented):
- Redaction gates every off-box payload. support-bundle now adds webhookUrl +
diagToken to CRED_KEYS, and exports redactLogText (value-scrub of live secret
strings + pattern-scrub of Discord webhooks / Bearer / api_key= / cookies /
sess ids) + valueScrub + collectSecretValues. read_log takes a logical NAME
(no path traversal); doodstream-debug.log is excluded from the readable set
(it logs live api-key-bearing HTML). grep is length-capped (ReDoS guard).
- diagnostics config subtree (enabled/port/token/label/codeIssuedAt/bindAddress)
defaults OFF, bind 127.0.0.1; deep-merge makes it migration-free. The
server-owned token is preserved against renderer clobber in both
save-global-settings handlers; the diagnostics:* IPC is the only mutator.
- app.requestSingleInstanceLock() (also the approved fix#6) so a relaunch can't
EADDRINUSE-kill the agent and two instances can't clobber the config.
main.js: buildDiagnosticCode (mhu1_ base64url, no host embedded), start/stop +
auto-start-on-launch + stop-on-quit, the four diagnostics:* IPC handlers.
renderer: a "Diagnose-Zugriff" settings subtab (toggle, port, bind-address,
copyable connection code + regenerate, status, read-only security note).
382 tests pass (incl. 11 new: collectors+redaction, agent whitelist, and a live
RemoteServer protocol test proving auth->diag-response correlation, that a
diagnostic client never triggers the capture window, and brute-force lockout).
Lint clean (0 errors). Smoke boots identically to baseline. The standalone MCP
gateway package + operator setup docs land in a follow-up commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The completed-upload dedup guard (_completedUploadKeys, "file|hoster") is the
single source of truth that keeps a finished job from being re-materialised as a
"Bereit" preview by buildQueuePreview(). Three independent paths leaked ghosts
back into the queue:
A) removeJobFromIndex() unconditionally DELETED the dedup key. The
removeFromQueueOnDone auto-remove path (handleProgress), the batch-done sweep,
and the terminal-job prune all call removeJobFromIndex on a *finished* job, so
the guard handleProgress had just added was immediately wiped and
buildQueuePreview re-created the job as a preview both mid-session and after
restart. removeJobFromIndex now takes keepCompletedKey; the three auto-removal
call sites pass true (keep the guard), while the manual-delete sites keep the
old behaviour (drop the guard so the user can re-add the file).
D/E) The dedup guard lived only in memory, so every restart began with an empty
set and buildQueuePreview rebuilt ghosts from the persisted selectedFiles.
buildPersistedQueueState() now serialises the keys whose file is still in the
snapshot (completedKeys) and restoreQueueStateFromConfig() re-seeds them. To
keep deliberate re-uploads working, applyHosterSelection() clears the
persisted key for every freshly (re-)added file: re-adding through the hoster
modal is the explicit "upload this again" signal. Both retry paths
(retrySelectedJobs, _retryFailedFromBuckets) mutate the existing job in place
instead of relying on buildQueuePreview, so they are unaffected.
H) buildQueuePreview() excluded error jobs from its existingKeys set, so a
file+hoster that already had an 'error' row got a second 'preview' row stacked
beside it. Error jobs now count as existing.
B/C) parseUploadLogLine() took the filename from a fixed field index and trimmed
it. A pipe inside the link shifted the field (entry lost from the log-based
dedup) and trimming broke matching against the untrimmed OS basename used as
the queue-job key. The filename is now the last non-empty field and is no
longer trimmed, so log lines with pipes in the URL and leading-space filenames
both match end-to-end.
362 tests pass, lint clean on all touched files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up hardening on the v3.3.80 queue-persistence fix after a deeper adversarial
sweep + reviewer pass over the WHOLE subsystem (not just the diff). Two real defects:
1. Basename-collision lost work (regression introduced by v3.3.80 FIX A).
restoreQueueStateFromConfig collapses jobs on the FULL path while the ts-gate keys
on basename|hoster. Two genuinely different files with the same basename queued to
the same hoster from different folders therefore share a gate key: if one was logged
after savedAt, the ts-rule dropped BOTH — silently losing the still-pending one.
Pre-FIX-A only 'done' jobs were dropped, so a pending file was never at risk.
Fix: an ambiguity guard in partitionRestoredJobsByLog — the ts-rule is suppressed
when a basename|hoster key maps to more than one distinct file path (the log records
only basenames, so it can't say which physical file completed). The done-in-log rule
is unchanged. Fails safe: worst case a visible ghost survives, never silent data loss.
2. selectedFiles re-materialization with removeFromQueueOnDone=ON (second mechanism,
independent of the stale snapshot). When that setting is on, a completed job is
stripped from queueJobs but its path stays in selectedFiles (syncSelectedFilesFromQueue
only runs at batch-done, never on a mid-upload close). On restart the ts-gate operates
on queueJobs and never sees it, then the startup updateUploadView -> buildQueuePreview
re-creates it as a preview ghost AFTER the gate ran, and it re-persists with a fresh
savedAt — sticky. Fix: completedSelectionKeys() seeds _completedUploadKeys (the set
buildQueuePreview already consults) from the log at startup, keyed on full path, with
the same ambiguity guard. Log-based so it survives a hard kill, consistent with FIX A.
Also extracts the orphan-tmp sweep decision into lib/orphan-tmp.js (was untested inline
code in main.js; behavior-preserving) and adds executable coverage for the paths that
were previously only argued from logic: orphan-tmp sweep, config-store pendingQueue+savedAt
round-trip, an end-to-end scenario in the exact user-reported shape (300 queued / ~200
finished mid-session), and a 3000+500-iteration property fuzz of the gate invariant
including the lost-work guarantee. 359/359 green, ESLint clean, smoke-boot unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closing the app (especially during an active upload or on a hard kill) and
reopening sometimes left already-uploaded files sitting in the queue as if
still pending. Root cause is three layers stacked:
1. Persist-starvation: persistQueueStateSoon() reset a 10s debounce on every
progress event, so during an upload the on-disk queue snapshot was never
rewritten and stayed frozen at the pre-upload state (all jobs "preview").
2. The beforeunload sync flush only covers a clean close; a hard kill / crash
leaves that stale snapshot on disk.
3. Startup auto-dedup only dropped jobs with status "done". The completed
files were stored as "preview" in the stale snapshot, so they survived and
reappeared.
Fix (mechanism-independent — holds whether the stale snapshot came from
starvation, a mid-upload close race, or a hard kill):
FIX A (core, durable): the upload log is the source of truth. Each persisted
snapshot is now stamped with savedAt; on restart any restored job whose newest
matching log entry is timestamped at/after floor(savedAt) is dropped regardless
of status — it provably completed after the snapshot, so a "preview" row for it
is a ghost. lib/queue-dedup.js gains an additive 3rd savedAt param; without
savedAt or without log timestamps it behaves exactly as before (the 5 canary
tests stay green, so intentional re-uploads of older files still survive).
FIX B: new lib/throttle-timer.js with a max-wait. During uploads the snapshot
is now written at most ~20s into a continuous progress burst instead of never;
idle stays a pure debounce. The fallback shim honors max-wait too, so a missing
library can never silently reintroduce the starvation.
FIX C: the synchronous close-write retries renameSync on EBUSY/EPERM/EACCES and
uses a pid-unique tmp (de-conflicts it from config-store._atomicWrite's fixed
.tmp). A startup sweep reclaims orphaned <config>.<pid>.tmp files left by a hard
kill between write and rename.
lib/upload-log.js extracts formatUploadLogLine + parseUploadLogLine from main.js
so the real writer -> reader -> gate seam is unit-tested (a future log-format or
epoch-basis change can no longer pass green while breaking the fix).
Verified: 334/334 tests green (incl. throttle fake-clock starvation/maxWait,
ts-gate multi-hoster partial-completion, and the real-format seam tests), ESLint
clean, smoke-boot identical to baseline, and an adversarial multi-agent review
(15 findings, 14 refuted, 1 low — the tmp orphan, now swept) on the diff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
v3.3.78 rejected upload-server hosts ending in the bare ".filemoon" label so the
lookup would retry for a valid server. In practice byse is currently returning a
truncated host for its WHOLE pool, so the rejection found nothing to fall back to and
turned every byse upload into a slow "Kein Upload-Server erhalten: OK" (6x2.5s server
retry per file) instead of the fast ENOTFOUND fail it had before. That is a worse UX
with zero upside while byse is down, so revert to the v3.3.77 behavior.
The premise (byse returns a MIX of good and truncated hosts, skip the bad ones) is
unverified; the evidence is byse returning truncated hosts for everything. And the
correct upload domain is NOT safely determinable from outside: a swarm of filemoon-brand
TLDs resolve (filemoon.eu/.me/.xyz/.art/.nl, kerapoxy.cc, moonmov.pro, ...) but the ones
probed are parked/squatted (parklogic landers, shared catch-all certs), and byse's real
response is only visible with a valid key. Guessing a TLD would point uploads at a parking
page or a third party, so we do not.
lib/hosters.js is now byte-identical to v3.3.77. The v3.3.77 fixes (5xx/ECONNRESET treated
as transient -> no failover cascade/blacklist; the /api/file/list path fix) are kept.
ENOTFOUND remains transient, so byse's outage fails clean (retry same account, no cascade)
with the actual unresolvable host shown in the message. Suite 311/311.
When byse restores its server pool (returns complete hostnames), uploads resume
automatically with no client change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
In v3.3.77 the byse uploads started failing with "getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND
s1065.filemoon" / "s1070.filemoon" / "s1075.filemoon". The hostname has no TLD,
so DNS cannot resolve it. Root cause: byse's GET /upload/server is INTERMITTENTLY
handing back a truncated upload-server host — "sNNNN.filemoon" with the TLD dropped
(consistent with byse's ongoing filemoon migration; their own docs already expose an
old_domain/new_domain embed switch). Some uploads still work because byse returns the
complete host on those; the failing ones got truncated. byse did not change the API
contract — this is malformed data from their server pool.
The correct upload domain is NOT externally verifiable: every TLD that resolves for
these server IDs is a parked/squatter domain (filemoon.art -> ParkLogic "lander" PTR;
filemoon.nl -> a shared catch-all cert for kaobei.cc/babesex.xyz/...). Appending a TLD
would point uploads at a parking page (or a third party) — so we do NOT guess one.
Instead, treat an obviously-truncated host as "no valid server": normalizeAbsoluteUrl
now returns null for any host ending in the bare ".filemoon" label (never a real TLD).
extractUploadServerUrl then yields nothing for that response, so getUploadServer falls
through to its existing machinery — it retries the lookup (SERVER_RETRY_ATTEMPTS) to get
a different server and, crucially, returns the last-known-good server from
LAST_UPLOAD_SERVERS once one has been cached. So after any single complete response, the
truncated ones transparently reuse the good server instead of uploading into a DNS void.
If byse's whole pool is truncating (cold cache), the lookup fails CLEAN as hosterTransient
(no cascade, no blacklist — the v3.3.77 behavior), and the next batch tries again.
This composes with v3.3.77: ENOTFOUND was already transient (retry same account, no
failover); this stops the unresolvable host from ever reaching the POST in the first place
when a working server is available.
Tests: extractUploadServerUrl rejects https://sNNNN.filemoon / bare sNNNN.filemoon /
https://filemoon and keeps a complete host (https://s1065.filemoon.sx/...) untouched.
Suite 313/313.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A single byse.sx gateway hiccup (HTTP 502 "<!doctype html>..." or a mid-upload
ECONNRESET) was cascading through the whole failover chain and blacklisting every
account for the batch. Root cause: the upload-POST throw sites threw PLAIN errors
with no classification, so a 502 was treated as a GENERIC error -> mark-failed ->
emit('account-failed') -> failover to the next account (which hits the same
gateway) -> repeat until the chain is exhausted, then poison sibling files in the
batch via the blacklist. The screenshots showed exactly this: "Primär ... Fallback
#3" all failing with the same 502. byse did NOT change their API (the upload
contract still matches their docs and was live-probed: GET /upload/server -> POST
{key}+file -> files[0].filecode); these are transient infrastructure failures.
A 5xx gateway error is not an account fault: every account hits the same gateway,
so failing over is pointless and blacklisting is harmful. Fail open instead — retry
the SAME account and, if byse stays down, fail the file cleanly without touching the
account or the rotation cursor.
- upload-manager: _isTransientNetworkError() now honors an explicit err.transientNetwork
flag (checked before the empty-message guard) and, as a defensive fallback, matches
/HTTP 5\d\d/, Bad Gateway, Service Unavailable, Gateway Time-out. The flag is made
authoritative in _isFileRejectedError and _shouldSkipRetryOnAccountError (both return
early when it is set) so a 5xx whose HTML body happens to contain a rejection/auth
keyword can never be mis-binned as file/account. The post-rotation retry loop also
breaks on a transient error (parity with the primary loop) to avoid burning the
retry budget re-uploading on a fallback.
- hosters: the upload POST throw sites tag err.transientNetwork when statusCode >= 500
(non-JSON body and non-2xx-with-JSON) and when the 2xx status-envelope carries
status:500; 401/403/429 stay PLAIN so they remain account errors. The server-lookup
path (apiGet/getUploadServer) is hardened symmetrically: a 5xx there tags
transientNetwork and getUploadServer preserves the flag onto its wrapped error, so
the heuristic shouldRetryServerLookup() can no longer be defeated by a 5xx body that
contains an auth keyword.
- hosters: fixed a separate real bug surfaced during investigation — _fetchByseFileList
built the wrong URL https://api.byse.sx/api/file/list (the /api/ prefix is correct
only for doodstream's doodapi.co host; byse already carries the api. subdomain).
Live-probed: /api/file/list 302-redirects to the docs page, /file/list returns 200
JSON. The wrong path made the byse async-recovery poll silently dead (always []),
removing the safety net that reclaims a large file that registered despite a 502.
Now https://api.byse.sx/file/list.
ECONNRESET was already transient and is unchanged. doodstream's 2xx empty-form stays
hosterTransient (one attempt, no re-upload). vidmoly/clouddrop use their own uploaders
and are unaffected; doodstream/voe apiKey uploads share uploadFile and correctly
benefit from the same 5xx-is-infra logic.
Deferred follow-up: poll-first-on-5xx dedup (route a 5xx through the now-working
recovery poll before retrying, to reclaim a registered-but-502 file instead of
re-uploading). It does not add new dupe risk vs the prior cascade and a pure 502
means the backend was never reached, so retry-same-account is dupe-safe for it.
Investigated and reviewed by two multi-agent workflows (4-lens investigation with a
synthesized fix spec; 4-lens adversarial review with per-finding verification): no
API drift, 0 confirmed defects. Tests: classifier units (flag-above-message-guard,
5xx-transient, 4xx-stay-account), an end-to-end 502/503/500-envelope tag through
uploadFile, and a 502-retries-same-account-no-cascade integration case. Suite 311/311.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The byse suspect size-memo (softened in v3.3.73 to arm only after two
confirmed suspect rejections on the same account and only for strictly
larger files) still occasionally pre-skips a primary account with
"Bekanntes Größen-Limit auf diesem Account", which the user finds annoying
when they would rather just let every file attempt the upload for real.
Add a per-hoster opt-out: a new "Größen-Limit merken" checkbox (Accounts tab,
default ON so existing behavior is preserved for everyone) that, when
unchecked, disables the memo-based pre-skip entirely for that hoster.
- config-store.js / upload-manager.js DEFAULT_SETTINGS: sizeMemoEnabled: true.
- upload-manager.js _suspectMemoBlocks(): returns false up front when the
hoster has sizeMemoEnabled === false. That single guard covers BOTH consult
sites — the pre-job block (skips the guaranteed-fail upload) and the
alternate-account skip — since both route through _suspectMemoBlocks. The
memo is still recorded; it is simply never allowed to block. This moves the
flow toward "fail open": with the toggle off, every file always gets a real
attempt on its account.
- The genuine suspect-reject alternates walk is gated on err.suspectReject,
not the memo, so disabling the memo does not weaken real failover — a file
the account actually rejects still rolls over to the next account.
- renderer/app.js: checkbox data-hs="sizeMemoEnabled", checked when
hs.sizeMemoEnabled !== false; persisted by the existing generic checkbox
path in saveHosterSettingsFromDom(). The running manager picks it up on the
next batch (fresh UploadManager) and immediately on save (updateSettings).
Tests: suspect-reject-alternates gains a disabled-memo case proving the larger
third file still gets a real primary attempt (key1 tried 3x, no
suspect-memo-skip event); config-store gains a default-true + persist-false
case. Full suite 305/305. Reviewed by a 4-lens adversarial workflow
(completeness / composition / persistence-ui / conventions): 0 findings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
v3.3.74 created a fresh account picker inside every buildUploadTasks /
buildUploadTasksFromJobs call, so its in-memory rotation index reset to 0
on each call. That is correct for a one-shot batch (drag-drop N files at
once distributes fine), but it silently no-ops in exactly the pattern the
byse 80-uploads/30-days quota cares about: the folder monitor feeds new
files into a *running* batch one detection at a time via add-jobs-to-batch
(renderer -> add-jobs-to-batch IPC), and per-detection autoStart likewise
fires start-upload per file. Each of those calls rebuilt the picker from
index 0, so account 1 won every single time and the secondary accounts
never received anything.
The rotation cursor now lives outside the picker and survives across calls
and across app restarts (the quota spans a rolling 30-day window, so a
session-only counter would still starve secondaries for users who restart
between small uploads):
- account-rotation.js: createAccountPicker() accepts a seed { indices } map,
resumes the per-hoster cursor from it, and exposes indices() (the advanced
cursors) + dirty() (whether any rotation actually happened this call). The
cursor is a monotonic counter taken mod the current enabled-account count,
so it keeps wrapping correctly even if an account is later enabled/disabled.
- config-store.js: new top-level rotationCursors map (added to DEFAULTS, read
back in load() which otherwise reconstructs the result and would drop
unknown keys) plus a saveRotationCursors() method. The existing
read-modify-write save() preserves it across unrelated settings/credential
saves; secret-store never touches it.
- main.js: a module-level _rotationCursors is the authoritative source of
truth (seeded once from disk on first use, updated synchronously per batch),
with config as restart-survival backing. makeAccountPicker() seeds the
picker from it; persistRotation() folds the advance back and flushes to
config only when dirty. Authoritative in-memory state also closes the
disk-read race two rapid batches would otherwise hit. Both task builders
now receive the picker instead of constructing their own.
Composition with failover is unchanged and verified: the picker only chooses
each file's *initial* account and is never called on the failover path. The
pre-job-swap reroutes a task only when that task's own account is in
_failedAccounts, so a dead account's jobs reroute while healthy accounts keep
their rotation share. No double-advance of the cursor.
Tests: account-rotation gains seeded-resume, drip-feed-across-pickers (the
regression), dirty()-semantics, carry-forward, and count-shrink-wrap cases;
config-store gains rotationCursors default, save round-trip, no-clobber, and
credentials-undisturbed cases. Full suite 303/303.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
byse.sx requires each account to upload >=80 videos in the last 30 days
(measured across a rolling 3-month window) or it goes dormant. With a
single primary account doing all the work, the other configured accounts
decay and eventually get suspended. This adds an opt-in "Accounts rotieren"
toggle per hoster that round-robins files across every enabled account that
has credentials: file 1 -> account 1, file 2 -> account 2, file 3 ->
account 3, then wraps. Off by default, so existing single-account behavior
is unchanged.
Mechanics:
- New lib/account-rotation.js: createAccountPicker() returns a stateful
pick(hoster) closure holding a per-hoster round-robin index. It only
rotates when rotateAccounts === true AND more than one usable account
exists; otherwise it returns the first enabled account (the old primary).
enabledAccountsFor() filters disabled + credential-less accounts while
preserving configured order, so a disabled account is simply skipped in
the cycle rather than leaving a gap.
- main.js: both buildUploadTasks() and buildUploadTasksFromJobs() now build
one picker per call and use pick(hoster) instead of getPrimaryAccount(),
which is now removed (dead code). A fresh picker per batch means each
upload session starts the cycle at account 1, matching "die erste Datei
auf Account eins".
- config-store.js: rotateAccounts: false added to HOSTER_SETTINGS_DEFAULTS.
- renderer/app.js: "Accounts rotieren" checkbox in the per-hoster upload
settings (Accounts tab). Persisted by the existing generic checkbox path
in saveHosterSettingsFromDom().
Composes with failover: rotation only chooses the *initial* account per
file. On a hard account failure the existing failover (_failedAccounts +
pre-job account swap) reroutes just that account's jobs; the healthy
accounts keep their rotation share.
Single enabled account (or rotation off) = no behavior change.
Tests: tests/account-rotation.test.js (10 cases) covers off=primary,
on=round-robin+wrap, single-account no-op, skip disabled, skip no-creds,
null when none usable, per-hoster index independence, byse-only rotation,
100-file 50/50 split, and the enabledAccountsFor filter. Full suite 294/294.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-batch size memo previously armed on a SINGLE confirmed suspect rejection
and blocked every same-or-larger file on that account (fileSize >= memoSize).
A single spurious byse "Not video file format" at e.g. 1.3GB therefore pre-failed
the whole series of ~1.3GB files in that batch with "Bekanntes Größen-Limit auf
diesem Account", even when byse could actually take that size.
Now the memo:
- arms only after the 2nd confirmed rejection on the same account (count >= 2),
so a lone byse aussetzer no longer short-circuits anything; and
- blocks only STRICTLY LARGER files (fileSize > memoSize), so a same-size file
always still gets one real attempt.
_suspectSizeMemo now stores { size: smallest-rejected, count } instead of a bare
number. Still per-batch (cleared at batch start, never re-primed across batches).
Updated the two memo tests to the new semantics (added a size-aware statSync mock
so a strictly-larger file can be exercised). Full suite 284 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of "4 accounts configured, rotation only ever uses 1-3": byse
returns HTTP 200 + per-file status "Not video file format" for valid MKVs
above an account's size tier (proven from the live rotation log: account
4ha0 accepted 1158 files up to 2.62 GB and deterministically rejected all
6 files >= 2.81 GB with that status, each costing a full ~20 min upload).
The parser tagged this fileRejected, which (a) skipped the 30s recovery
poll that was originally BUILT for this misleading status (guard regression
from "byse skips 30s recovery poll on explicit reject") and (b) made the
upload manager skip rotation entirely - so the remaining accounts were
never tried and the files failed forever. Account selection is
primary-first failover, so a later account only ever runs when every
earlier one is hard-failed or disabled, which matches the reported
"account 4 only gets used when I disable the others".
The fix, layered:
- parseByseResult flags "Not video file format" as err.suspectReject
(alongside fileRejected). Genuine rejections (Duplicate, too small,
account-level disk-full) behave exactly as before.
- uploadFile runs the byse recovery poll again for suspect rejections
(the file often registers asynchronously despite the status), but skips
it when the caller's file probe says the upload is genuinely not a video
(new opts.probeIsVideoLike, threaded from the upload manager's probe).
Poll helpers now swallow an abort during their sleep and return null so
a cancelled poll surfaces the original error instead of a bare
AbortError.
- upload-manager: on a suspect rejection of a probe-verified video, the
file gets ONE attempt on each remaining pool account (new accountPools
from main.js, refreshed on save-config) - WITHOUT blacklisting the
rejecting account, which keeps working for smaller files. A per-batch
size memo (hoster:account -> smallest rejected size) plus a known-good
account preference prevent re-uploading every following oversized file
through the whole chain: the second file skips known-limited accounts
outright and goes straight to the account that took the first one.
Alternates that fail with a genuine account error (quota/ban/full) are
marked failed in-batch so no later file burns a multi-GB upload on them;
deliberately no account-failed emit there, as repointing the hoster-wide
override would reroute normal-sized files away from a healthy primary.
- Rotation hardening from the adversarial review: the rotated-to retry
loop now fast-breaks on file-rejected/hoster-transient errors instead of
burning maxAttempts full uploads, and a file-class error on a rotated
account no longer blacklists that account (it fails only the file).
Cancelling mid-alternates or mid-rotation now records the job as
aborted instead of error (this also stops the batch webhook from firing
on fully user-cancelled batches). New upload-failure rot-logs are
guarded against logging user aborts as failures; rotation retries are
now visible in the rotation log at all (previously failures on a
rotated-to account were never logged, which is why account 2's death
was invisible in the support log).
- file-probe: the mpeg-ts signature required only a single leading 0x47
byte, so GIFs and "G"-prefixed text classified as video and would have
qualified junk for pool-wide alternate uploads; it now requires TS
sync-byte periodicity (0x47 at offsets 0/188/376) and the probe head
read grew from 64 to 512 bytes to make that check possible. GIF gets
its own non-video signature.
Tests: 9 new/reworked across suspect-reject-alternates.test.js (alternate
walk, no blacklist, memo short-circuit, account-error marking, abort
labeling, probe gating) and byse-reject-recovery.test.js (suspect polls +
recovers, empty poll throws suspectReject, Duplicate still fast-fails,
probe-confirmed non-video skips the poll) plus a TS/GIF probe regression
test. Full suite 276 green.
The Upload-Verlauf tab took 30s+ to open on large, never-cleared histories.
Measured on the live config: 18.9 MB config / 41 batches / 53,403 rendered rows.
Two independent problems, fixed together:
1. Render side (the 30s killer): renderHistoryTable built ALL rows into one
innerHTML. Now the build is capped to the newest 2,000 rows (HISTORY_RENDER_CAP)
after slicing the chronological tail, then sorted for display. A notice shows
"Zeige neueste 2000 von N" so nothing looks deleted; full history stays on disk
and "Verlauf exportieren" still emits everything (export reads loadHistory()).
2. Storage side: history grew unbounded because appendHistory only ever pushed.
New globalSettings.historyRetention ('all' default, non-destructive) with
policies: 7d / 30d / 90d (time-based) and 1000 / 100 (newest-uploads-based).
appendHistory now prunes after each batch; a new prune-history IPC re-applies
the policy immediately when the user changes it, gated behind a confirm() that
shows the exact removal count (dry-run first).
Prune model keeps whole batches (atomic): count policies accumulate rendered rows
from the newest batch backward and always keep >= the newest batch even if it
alone exceeds the target; time policies keep batches whose timestamp is missing
or unparseable (old entries have none) so ambiguous data is never silently dropped.
New retention dropdown lives in the Verlauf header. 9 unit tests cover the prune
edge cases incl. a realistic 41-batch fixture. Full suite: 272 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
User report: in session mode the upload-log lines split across two files — the
first few before the auto-persist fallback fired, the rest after into a path
with the session-stamp DOUBLED.
Root cause in main.js _persistFallbackLogPath:
1. The strip was gated on the legacy `sessionLog` boolean, which 3.3.35 retired
in favour of `logMode`. So in session/daily mode the gate was false and the
resolved path got persisted with its stamp intact.
2. Even when the gate triggered, its regex matched only the daily YYYY-MM-DD
suffix, not the session "session-YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM-SS-pid" suffix.
The next getLogFilePath() call read that saved path as the "base", treated the
already-stamped filename as the base name, and re-applied another stamp on top.
First flush hit the original session file; everything after hit a doubly-
stamped one — exactly the symptom (top file: 2 lines, bottom file: the rest).
- lib/log-mode.js: new pure stripModeStampFromFileName helper that removes both
the daily and the session suffix patterns. Anchored to $, no nested
quantifiers (linear).
- main.js: gate on logMode (not sessionLog) and call the helper for daily AND
session, so logFilePath always persists as a bare base.
- Tests: 4 new — strip behaviour + an idempotence regression that locks in
"resolve → strip → resolve = same path" so this can't silently come back. 204/200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a third choice next to the existing single-file and per-day modes: a new
log file is created at every app start (process boot) and used until the app is
closed. A close → reopen of the app starts a new session, hence a new file.
File pattern: fileuploader-session-YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM-SS-<pid>.log.
The boolean sessionLog field — misnamed: it actually toggled daily mode — is
replaced by a logMode enum: "single" | "daily" | "session". The misnomer made
the migration the trap to watch: existing users with sessionLog:true must land
on "daily", NOT "session". normalizeLogMode handles this and is unit-tested.
- lib/log-mode.js (new, pure, dual CJS/window export): normalizeLogMode +
resolveLogFileName + format helpers. No fs, no Date.now() at call time.
- config-store.js: normalize at the single load() boundary so downstream
readers consume logMode only. logMode is deliberately NOT seeded in DEFAULTS
(would beat the legacy migration after merge).
- main.js: stamp SESSION_ID once at process start (with pid hedge against
same-second restart collisions); getLogFilePath and buildFallbackLogName
switch on mode via the lib. _resolveUploadLogTarget cache key is now just
the primary path, which already encodes mode/date/session — self-invalidates.
- renderer: <select> with three German labels replaces the old checkbox;
saveSettings writes logMode; index.html loads the lib so window.LogMode is
available in renderSettings.
- Tests: 14 log-mode tests (incl. legacy-migration regression), 3 config-store
tests (defaults, legacy migration, round-trip all three values). 200/200.
End-to-end simulated locally: two launches → two distinct session files; PID
hedge produces distinct names even within the same second.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live diagnosis against the real account: it holds 90,548 files. The recovery
fetched only page 1 of /api/file/list without forcing order, so a just-uploaded
file could be missed if the default sort isn't newest-first. Add
sort=created&order=desc — verified to return the account's newest uploads first —
so the codeless-result recovery reliably finds the file regardless of account
size.
Diagnosis also confirmed the fix's premise: the API key is valid, /api/upload/server
returns a working node even on a lapsed-premium account, and uploads DO land
server-side (many Burn Notice episodes uploaded in the failure window are present).
So the API path returns the filecode directly and sidesteps the intermittent
web-form empty-result; entering the API key makes uploads succeed. 183/183.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Direct improvement to the login/web path (no API key needed): we were POSTing a
stale field set — sess_id + utype=reg + file — but doodstream's CURRENT upload
form dropped `utype` and added file_title / fakefilepc / submit_btn. Submitting
an incomplete/stale field set can make the CDN node accept the bytes but skip
the registration step (→ the empty result form with no fn). Now we parse the
live upload form (already fetched in _getUploadServer) and replicate ALL its
non-file fields faithfully — exactly what the browser submits — while keeping
sess_id (the fresh node token) and utype as a harmless compatibility extra.
- _parseUploadFormFields(html): pull every named input/button from the upload
form, excluding the file input (streamed separately). Adapts to whatever
fields doodstream uses now rather than hardcoding.
- upload() builds the multipart from those fields; minimal known-good fallback
if the form wasn't parsed.
- Tests: real-form extraction (incl. file-input exclusion) + no-form safety. 183/183.
Low regression risk (superset of the previously-working fields). Whether it
resolves the large-file empty-form is for the server run; the API path
(3.3.31/32) remains the reliable route when a key is available/derivable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the gap between the unit-tested parseDoodstreamResult and the real
uploadFile orchestration. Mocks the undici transport (reassign undici.request +
refresh the hosters cache; mock.module needs an experimental flag npm test
doesn't pass) and global fetch, then drives the full doodstream API path against
the doc-verified response shapes:
- filecode returned directly in result[0].filecode → used.
- codeless 2xx → recovered by polling file/list and name-matching the title.
- codeless + file never appears → throws with err.hosterTransient=true (so the
account is not blacklisted).
Verified live this session: doodapi.co returns {"status":400,"msg":"Invalid
key"} for a bad key, so validation/list logic keys off status correctly.
Also makes the recovery poll count/delay tunable via __test.DOODSTREAM_POLL
(same 12 × 2.5 s defaults — non-behavioral) so the exhaustion test runs in ms.
Full suite 181/181.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backstop for the API path: if the doodapi upload POST returns no filecode (the
same backend registration hiccup that empties the web form), poll
doodapi.co/api/file/list for a newly-appeared file whose normalized title
matches what we uploaded, and claim its code — instead of failing the upload.
This is the exact recovery byse already uses in this file for the identical
symptom (large MKV, server-side "OK" but empty immediate response, file shows up
in the account shortly after). Doodstream is the same XFileSharing family with
the same doodapi-style API, and it directly addresses the user's observation
that the same file often succeeds on a second run.
- _fetchDoodstreamFileList / _resolveDoodstreamUploadByName: list via
/api/file/list?key=&per_page=200, baseline-diff + exact normalized-title match
(never "take the only new one", so parallel uploads can't claim each other's
files), 12 polls × 2.5s.
- uploadFile snapshots a doodstream baseline before upload and polls after a
codeless result, before the hosterTransient throw.
Verified solo: doodapi.co is reachable and returns {"status":400,"msg":"Invalid
key"} for a bad key, so the validation/list path keys off status correctly.
178/178. The real large-file run on the server is the final confirmation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The user uploads with username/password (login), so 3.3.30's "use API when a
key is configured" did nothing for them — and the web-form upload keeps failing
with empty forms on large files. Fix the LOGIN path itself: after logging in,
pull the account's API key out of the logged-in session and upload via the
official doodapi API (which returns result[0].filecode directly, no empty form).
The user keeps using login and configures nothing.
How the key is derived without knowing doodstream's (cookie-gated, unseen)
settings DOM: brute-force candidate extraction + API validation.
- DoodstreamUploader.deriveApiKey(): fetch the logged-in settings page
(?op=my_account / /settings), pull every plausible long token from form-field
values + element contents (ranked: tokens near an "api" mention first), and
validate each against doodapi.co/api/account/info — only the account's real
key returns status 200. A wrong guess is therefore harmless (fails validation
→ web fallback). Logs the raw settings HTML when nothing validates, so the
scrape can be refined from a real capture if doodstream's markup differs.
- upload-manager: doodstream login-path now resolves the key ONCE per batch
(cached by accountId; '' = tried-none) and routes to the API when found, else
the existing web-form upload. Keyless accounts: one extra probe-login per
batch, then unchanged.
- Tests: candidate extraction (value/textarea/api_key shapes, api-context
ranking), validate-then-pick, null→web-fallback, preset short-circuit. 178/178.
If derivation works the login path now uploads via the API. It does NOT change
doodstream's backend; the server run confirms. Falls back safely if no key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The new API upload path POSTs to the same cloudatacdn.com nodes as the web
path, so it can hit the same backend flake — a 2xx response with no filecode, or
a transient "no servers available" from /api/upload/server (now that the stale
fallback node is gone). hosters.uploadFile threw GENERIC errors for both, which
the upload-manager would treat as an account failure → mark-failed →
pre-job-swap-blocked on the next batch: the exact symptom 3.3.29 fixed for the
web path, reintroduced via the unprotected API path.
Tag both API-path analogs of the empty form as err.hosterTransient=true:
- codeless 2xx ("lieferte keine file_code-Antwort") — bytes accepted, no link.
- transient "no upload server" (shouldRetryServerLookup true: no-servers/busy/
try-again) — but NOT genuine auth failures (invalid key/unauthorized), which
stay classified as account errors.
The upload-manager checks _isHosterTransientError (flag-based) before the
account-error classifier, so both now fail the file without blacklisting the
account. Consumption side already covered by the 3.3.29 regression test. 173/173.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of the recurring "kein Filecode — Server gab leeren Link zurueck":
the web-session upload flow gets the filecode back inside an XFileSharing HTML
form, and on long/large uploads that form comes back empty (no fn). Verified
research: doodstream's server-side file-registration callback times out under
large-file load, so the upload "succeeds" (bytes sent, HTTP 200) but no filecode
is minted — and because registration failed, the file is NOT in the file list
either, so polling can't recover it. The web path also rides a per-page-load
sess_id token that ages over the multi-minute upload.
The official doodapi.co JSON API has no such failure mode for result retrieval:
the upload response returns result[0].filecode directly, and it authenticates
with a persistent api_key (no aging sess_id). Git history confirms the API was
doodstream's ORIGINAL upload path (initial commit); web login was added later
only "as an alternative to API key" — so preferring the key restores the
intended primary path rather than fighting a deliberate choice.
- lib/account-auth.js (new, pure, unit-tested): selectUploadAuth() prefers the
doodstream API key over username/password; all other hosters unchanged.
- main.js buildTaskFromAccount delegates to it → a doodstream account with an
apiKey now routes through hosters.uploadFile (doodapi API) instead of the web
uploader; keyless accounts keep using web login.
- hosters.js: drop the stale hardcoded fallback node from the doodstream API
config (same dead tr1128ve host removed from the web path) so a failed server
lookup throws cleanly instead of uploading into a dead end.
- Tests: 8 routing cases (doodstream key-preference, keyless fallback, voe
unaffected, authType=api, null-safety). Full suite 173/173.
This eliminates the empty-form failure mode for result retrieval when a key is
configured. It does NOT change doodstream's backend — whether the large-file
timeout recurs (now as a structured JSON error, not a silent empty form) is for
the server run to confirm. Requires a doodstream API key on the account.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "kein Filecode — Server gab leeren Link zurueck" error was treated as a
generic upload failure → after retries exhausted, the manager called mark-failed
and added the account to _failedAccounts → next batch re-primed with
primedFailed=1 → pre-job-swap-blocked because no fallback override exists for a
single-account hoster. One server-side flake permanently poisoned the session.
It's not an account problem — same account + same file works on a later try.
This is a doodstream-backend processing flake (empty CDN form, no fn / no st),
the same class as a transient network error: don't blacklist, just fail this
file cleanly.
- doodstream-upload.js: tag the empty-form throw with err.hosterTransient=true
(explicit flag, primary signal — matches the err.accountError / err.fileRejected
pattern already used elsewhere).
- upload-manager.js: new _isHosterTransientError classifier (flag first, message
regex as defensive fallback). In the retry loop: break on first hit (server
flake won't clear in 3 s, re-uploading the file 4× is pure bandwidth waste).
Post-loop: dedicated branch that emits the final error WITHOUT blacklisting
the account — same shape as the existing transient-network branch.
- Tests: classifier unit tests (flag path, regex path, negatives) + regression
test that proves the account is NOT added to _failedAccounts and mark-failed
does NOT fire. Drops the hoster-transient test from ~19 s to ~1.5 ms,
confirming the in-loop fast-break works.
We now fail fast on this error class instead of retrying — the next-batch
manual retry is the recovery path, and the account stays usable for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reproduced from a real saved config: pendingQueue held 4 'preview' jobs (one
file across 4 hosters); the queue saved + restored correctly. But
_autoDeduplicateFromLog (runs at init after restore) removed jobs whose
fileName|hoster appeared ANYWHERE in the lifetime fileuploader.log, regardless
of status — so all 4 pending previews were deleted and the queue showed the
empty "Dateien hierhin ziehen" state. Looked update-specific only because the
server restarts on update; a plain restart did the same.
- New lib/queue-dedup.js (pure, dual CJS/window export like queue-prune.js):
partitionRestoredJobsByLog drops ONLY 'done' jobs that match the log. Pending
(preview/queued) and failed (error/aborted) jobs always survive — they're
intentional queued work (often a deliberate re-upload of a previously
uploaded file). Manual importUploadLog stays separate/explicit.
- renderer wires it in; index.html loads the module before app.js.
- Tests: 5 cases incl. the exact reproduced scenario (4 previews all in log ->
0 removed). Full suite 162/162.
Verified against the user's real electron-config.json + fileuploader.log: old
logic removed 4/4 (empty queue), new logic removes 0/4 (queue preserved).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After 3.3.26 fixed the filecode parsing, the remaining intermittent failure is
a generic "fetch failed" — a transient network error on one of the requests
around the multi-minute upload. Can't tell from one log line whether it's the
server-discovery GET or the post-upload result-submit, so harden both:
- _fetch (the native-fetch chokepoint for discovery, redirects, result-submit):
retry up to 3x with short backoff on a thrown network error, each attempt
bounded by a 20s timeout (Node fetch has none by default). Caller aborts are
not retried. The big file upload (undici) is retried at the upload-manager
level, not here.
- result-submit is now best-effort: if it still fails after retries but we
already hold the filecode from the CDN response, return that instead of
discarding a completed upload.
- label the undici upload-POST error with phase + MB sent + node, preserving the
original message so transient classification still matches.
- eslint: add AbortSignal to globals.
- Tests: _fetch transient-retry path (10 doodstream tests total).
"fetch failed" is already classified transient by upload-manager, so this is
additive resilience; next logs will show if anything still slips through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
