v3.3.101
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Administrator
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b25b51840d |
test(diagnostics): live network-bind path — allowlisted non-loopback peer connects over a real 0.0.0.0 socket
Closes the one link the unit/wiring tests covered only by composition: binds 0.0.0.0, allowlists a real LAN IPv4, and asserts auth-ok over a real socket (the Tailscale path). Skips when no non-internal IPv4 interface exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Administrator
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0c6c502aab |
feat(diagnostics): network bind + fail-closed IP allowlist + host-in-code (Tailscale, like rd-diagnostics-mcp)
Matches the Real-Debrid-Downloader's rd-diagnostics-mcp model so the read-only
diagnostics agent is reachable over Tailscale (or any private tunnel) the same way
the downloader is, instead of requiring an SSH local-forward.
- lib/ip-allowlist.js (NEW): fail-closed IP allowlist — normalizeIp strips
::ffff:, loopback is always allowed, an empty allowlist accepts loopback ONLY
(fail-closed), exact IP + CIDR (incl. the Tailscale CGNAT range 100.64.0.0/10) +
wildcard rules. The real socket peer IP is the authority (never a forwarded header).
- remote-server.js: rejects non-allowlisted peers at connection (close 4005). Opt-in
via config.allowlist (the existing remote-control server, which passes none, is
unaffected). Loopback always passes, so local + SSH-forward use keeps working.
- Two bind modes (config diagnostics.bindMode): "local" -> 127.0.0.1 (default),
"network" -> 0.0.0.0 but ONLY when a non-empty allowlist is set (else it stays
loopback, fail-closed). The allowlist + token gate access; the tunnel
(Tailscale/WireGuard) is the confidentiality layer (transport is still plaintext ws://).
- The connection code now carries the host: mhu1_<base64url{v,h,p,t,n,fp?,s?}>. The
gateway decode is tolerant of the legacy {port,token,label} keys; connect_server
takes the host from the code (host arg is an optional override). Proven end-to-end:
the integration harness now connects with NO host arg and resolves it from the code.
- Renderer: Sichtbarkeit selector (local/network), public-host input with
suggested-host chips (os.networkInterfaces — the Tailscale IP shows up there),
allowlist textarea (network mode), and network-requires-allowlist validation.
- main.js: bindMode->host, getSuggestedRemoteHosts, host-in-code, allowlist plumbed
into startDiagnosticAgent + the diagnostics IPC (get/save/status).
- docs: rewritten for Tailscale (set the allowlist to your tailnet, put the Tailscale
IP/MagicDNS in the code address — no SSH forward needed).
This supersedes the v3.3.85 hard loopback-lock with the downloader's allowlist model.
Tests: lib/ip-allowlist (8) + remote-server allowlist wiring/loopback (2) + gateway
decode (host short-key + legacy tolerance). 393 app tests + 9 gateway tests + e2e +
host-in-code integration + adversarial all green; lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Administrator
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ab7313f32c |
feat(diagnostics): read-only remote diagnostics agent over the existing WS transport (app side)
Adds the server/app half of a remote-diagnostics system so Claude (via a local MCP gateway, added separately) can read a server's full state to diagnose problems: logs, errors, queue/app state, redacted config, system health. All read-only; security review folded in as hard requirements. Architecture (design-verified): - A SECOND, independent RemoteServer instance (diagnosticMode) on its own port (default 9110, bind 127.0.0.1) with NO capture/input callbacks, so screen capture and sendInputEvent are structurally unreachable from the diagnostic path. The existing screen-share server (port 9100) is byte-for-byte unchanged. - lib/remote-server.js: a `host` bind option, a post-auth `diag-request` branch that delegates to onDiagnosticRequest and replies with a reqId-correlated `diag-response`, a `diagnosticMode` guard (capture never spawns), a timing-safe token compare (length-guarded), and getLastAccess(). - lib/diagnostics-agent.js: handle(op,args) enforces a HARDCODED read-only op whitelist as the sole authority — no write/exec op, no run_health_check. - lib/diagnostics-collectors.js: pure, dependency-injected collectors (server_health one-shot hub, read_log, list_errors, get_queue_state, get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info, list_logs, get_app_events, get_rotation_state, get_health) reusing support-bundle + stats. Security (all mandatory, implemented): - Redaction gates every off-box payload. support-bundle now adds webhookUrl + diagToken to CRED_KEYS, and exports redactLogText (value-scrub of live secret strings + pattern-scrub of Discord webhooks / Bearer / api_key= / cookies / sess ids) + valueScrub + collectSecretValues. read_log takes a logical NAME (no path traversal); doodstream-debug.log is excluded from the readable set (it logs live api-key-bearing HTML). grep is length-capped (ReDoS guard). - diagnostics config subtree (enabled/port/token/label/codeIssuedAt/bindAddress) defaults OFF, bind 127.0.0.1; deep-merge makes it migration-free. The server-owned token is preserved against renderer clobber in both save-global-settings handlers; the diagnostics:* IPC is the only mutator. - app.requestSingleInstanceLock() (also the approved fix #6) so a relaunch can't EADDRINUSE-kill the agent and two instances can't clobber the config. main.js: buildDiagnosticCode (mhu1_ base64url, no host embedded), start/stop + auto-start-on-launch + stop-on-quit, the four diagnostics:* IPC handlers. renderer: a "Diagnose-Zugriff" settings subtab (toggle, port, bind-address, copyable connection code + regenerate, status, read-only security note). 382 tests pass (incl. 11 new: collectors+redaction, agent whitelist, and a live RemoteServer protocol test proving auth->diag-response correlation, that a diagnostic client never triggers the capture window, and brute-force lockout). Lint clean (0 errors). Smoke boots identically to baseline. The standalone MCP gateway package + operator setup docs land in a follow-up commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |