Intensive end-to-end testing (a live gateway-MCP <-> agent integration harness +
an adversarial redaction/abuse probe + an independent security audit) surfaced
three real issues in the shipped read-only diagnostic agent. All run in lib/**,
which is packaged in the app.
1. grep ReDoS froze the Electron main process. read_log compiled the
client-supplied grep into `new RegExp(grep, 'i')` and ran it synchronously over
the log tail IN the main process. A catastrophic pattern (e.g. "(a+)+$" against
a long line) hangs the whole app — empirically confirmed (8s timeout, killed).
JS regex is synchronous and uncancellable, so grep is now a case-insensitive
literal substring filter with "|" alternation ("error|timeout|502"). Provably
linear-time; covers the real diagnostic need.
2. Prototype-chain whitelist bypass. The op table was a plain object literal, so
handle("constructor" | "toString" | "valueOf", ...) resolved an inherited
Object.prototype function, passed the `typeof fn === 'function'` guard and
returned {ok:true}. Harmless functions today, but a whitelist-integrity hole.
Now guarded with a string check + Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.
3. Redaction defense-in-depth gaps. redactLogText now also scrubs: basic-auth URL
passwords (scheme://user:pass@host), Authorization: Basic, JWTs (eyJ...x.y.z),
and bare/JSON session= values. Mostly theoretical in today's readable logs
(secret-bearing bodies go to the excluded doodstream-debug.log; other hosters
throw static strings) but matters as the verbose-logging surface grows.
Verified: 383 app tests (incl. new regression tests for all three), the live
gateway-MCP integration harness (all 14 tools, zero leaks, error paths), the
adversarial probe (14/14+ secret shapes scrubbed, ReDoS 1ms, lockout, malformed
args), e2e gate, lint 0 errors. Only residual: a standalone high-entropy blob with
zero key/Bearer/URL context — inherent to any denylist, acknowledged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
134 lines
5.9 KiB
JavaScript
134 lines
5.9 KiB
JavaScript
import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
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import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import assert from 'node:assert';
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import { encode, decode } from '../code.js';
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import { AgentClient } from '../agent-client.js';
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const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
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const root = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..', '..');
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const RemoteServer = require(join(root, 'lib', 'remote-server.js'));
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const support = require(join(root, 'lib', 'support-bundle.js'));
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const stats = require(join(root, 'lib', 'stats.js'));
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const { createCollectors } = require(join(root, 'lib', 'diagnostics-collectors.js'));
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const { createAgent } = require(join(root, 'lib', 'diagnostics-agent.js'));
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const SECRET_API = 'SUPERSECRET_apikey_9f8e7d6c5b4a';
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const SECRET_PW = 'hunter2_password_zxcv';
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const SECRET_TOKEN = 'bearer_tok_qwerty12345';
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const WEBHOOK = 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456789012345678/abcDEF_secretWebhookToken-xyz';
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const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mhu-e2e-'));
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const debugLog = join(tmp, 'debug.log');
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const dood = join(tmp, 'doodstream-debug.log');
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writeFileSync(debugLog, [
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`[2026-06-19T10:00:00Z] starting upload with apiKey=${SECRET_API}`,
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`[2026-06-19T10:00:01Z] Authorization: Bearer ${SECRET_TOKEN}`,
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`[2026-06-19T10:00:02Z] posting to ${WEBHOOK}`,
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`[2026-06-19T10:00:03Z] password ${SECRET_PW} used`,
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`[2026-06-19T10:00:04Z] normal benign line`,
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].join('\n'));
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writeFileSync(dood, `[doodstream] live apiKey=${SECRET_API}\n`);
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const fakeConfig = {
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hosters: { doodstream: [{ accountId: 'acc1', apiKey: SECRET_API, password: SECRET_PW }] },
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hosterSettings: {},
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globalSettings: {
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webhookUrl: WEBHOOK,
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diagnostics: { enabled: true, port: 9110, token: 'x'.repeat(64) },
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pendingQueue: { savedAt: '2026-06-19T09:00:00Z', queueJobs: [{ file: 'a.mp4', fileName: 'a.mp4', hoster: 'doodstream', status: 'error', error: `failed with apiKey=${SECRET_API}` }, { file: 'b.mp4', fileName: 'b.mp4', hoster: 'streamtape', status: 'error', error: `upload rejected: token=${SECRET_TOKEN}` }], selectedUploadHosters: ['doodstream'], selectedFiles: ['a.mp4', 'b.mp4'] },
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},
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rotationCursors: { doodstream: 1 },
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history: [{ timestamp: '2026-06-19T08:00:00Z', files: [{ name: 'a.mp4', results: [{ hoster: 'doodstream', status: 'error', error: `boom token=${SECRET_TOKEN}` }] }] }],
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};
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function getAllLogPaths() {
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return { fileuploader: join(tmp, 'fileuploader.log'), debug: debugLog, accountRotation: join(tmp, 'rot.log'), doodstreamDebug: dood, crashLog: join(tmp, 'crash.log'), logDir: tmp };
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}
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const collectors = createCollectors({
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loadConfig: () => fakeConfig,
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getAllLogPaths,
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support,
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stats,
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appInfo: () => ({ version: '9.9.9' }),
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systemInfo: () => ({ platform: 'win32', hostname: 'TESTHOST' }),
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agentInfo: () => ({ version: '9.9.9', port: 9110 }),
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});
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const agent = createAgent(collectors);
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const TOKEN = 'z'.repeat(64);
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const srv = new RemoteServer();
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const SECRETS = [SECRET_API, SECRET_PW, SECRET_TOKEN, 'abcDEF_secretWebhookToken-xyz'];
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function assertNoLeak(label, payload) {
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const text = JSON.stringify(payload);
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for (const s of SECRETS) {
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assert.ok(!text.includes(s), `LEAK in ${label}: secret "${s.slice(0, 12)}…" appeared in response`);
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}
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}
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(async () => {
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await srv.start({
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port: 0,
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host: '127.0.0.1',
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token: TOKEN,
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diagnosticMode: true,
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onDiagnosticRequest: (msg, _client, reply) => {
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let r;
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try { r = agent.handle(msg.op, msg.args); }
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catch (e) { r = { ok: false, error: String(e && e.message || e) }; }
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reply(r);
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},
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});
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const port = srv.getPort();
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const code = encode({ v: 1, port, token: TOKEN, label: 'e2e' });
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const payload = decode(code);
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assert.equal(payload.token, TOKEN);
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const client = new AgentClient({ host: '127.0.0.1', port, token: payload.token });
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await client.connect();
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const health = await client.request('server_health', { errorLimit: 10 });
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assert.equal(health.ok, true, 'server_health must succeed: ' + JSON.stringify(health));
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assertNoLeak('server_health', health);
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assert.ok(health.data.errors, 'server_health has errors section');
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assert.ok(health.data.queue, 'server_health has queue section');
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const log = await client.request('read_log', { name: 'debug', tailKb: 64 });
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assert.equal(log.ok, true, 'read_log debug must succeed');
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assert.ok(log.data.content.includes('normal benign line'), 'benign content preserved');
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assertNoLeak('read_log:debug', log);
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const dl = await client.request('read_log', { name: 'doodstream', tailKb: 64 });
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assert.equal(dl.ok, false, 'doodstream log MUST NOT be readable (live api keys)');
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const trav = await client.request('read_log', { name: '../../../etc/passwd' });
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assert.equal(trav.ok, false, 'path traversal must be rejected');
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const cfg = await client.request('get_config_redacted', { section: 'all' });
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assert.equal(cfg.ok, true, 'get_config_redacted must succeed');
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assertNoLeak('get_config_redacted', cfg);
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const queue = await client.request('get_queue_state', { includeJobs: true });
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assert.equal(queue.ok, true, 'get_queue_state must succeed');
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assert.ok(Array.isArray(queue.data.jobs) && queue.data.jobs.length >= 2, 'jobs present');
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assertNoLeak('get_queue_state:includeJobs', queue);
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const queueDefault = await client.request('get_queue_state', {});
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assert.equal(queueDefault.ok, true, 'get_queue_state (default args) must succeed');
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assertNoLeak('get_queue_state:default', queueDefault);
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const writeAttempt = await client.request('save_config', { x: 1 });
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assert.equal(writeAttempt.ok, false, 'unknown/write op must be rejected by whitelist');
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client.close();
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srv.stop();
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console.log('E2E PASS: connect → server_health/read_log/get_config_redacted succeeded; NO secrets leaked; doodstream + traversal + write rejected.');
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process.exit(0);
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})().catch((e) => { console.error('E2E FAIL:', e && e.stack || e); try { srv.stop(); } catch {} process.exit(1); });
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