Multi-Hoster-Upload/tests/diagnostics-protocol.test.js
Administrator ab7313f32c feat(diagnostics): read-only remote diagnostics agent over the existing WS transport (app side)
Adds the server/app half of a remote-diagnostics system so Claude (via a local
MCP gateway, added separately) can read a server's full state to diagnose
problems: logs, errors, queue/app state, redacted config, system health. All
read-only; security review folded in as hard requirements.

Architecture (design-verified):
- A SECOND, independent RemoteServer instance (diagnosticMode) on its own port
  (default 9110, bind 127.0.0.1) with NO capture/input callbacks, so screen
  capture and sendInputEvent are structurally unreachable from the diagnostic
  path. The existing screen-share server (port 9100) is byte-for-byte unchanged.
- lib/remote-server.js: a `host` bind option, a post-auth `diag-request` branch
  that delegates to onDiagnosticRequest and replies with a reqId-correlated
  `diag-response`, a `diagnosticMode` guard (capture never spawns), a
  timing-safe token compare (length-guarded), and getLastAccess().
- lib/diagnostics-agent.js: handle(op,args) enforces a HARDCODED read-only op
  whitelist as the sole authority — no write/exec op, no run_health_check.
- lib/diagnostics-collectors.js: pure, dependency-injected collectors
  (server_health one-shot hub, read_log, list_errors, get_queue_state,
  get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info, list_logs, get_app_events,
  get_rotation_state, get_health) reusing support-bundle + stats.

Security (all mandatory, implemented):
- Redaction gates every off-box payload. support-bundle now adds webhookUrl +
  diagToken to CRED_KEYS, and exports redactLogText (value-scrub of live secret
  strings + pattern-scrub of Discord webhooks / Bearer / api_key= / cookies /
  sess ids) + valueScrub + collectSecretValues. read_log takes a logical NAME
  (no path traversal); doodstream-debug.log is excluded from the readable set
  (it logs live api-key-bearing HTML). grep is length-capped (ReDoS guard).
- diagnostics config subtree (enabled/port/token/label/codeIssuedAt/bindAddress)
  defaults OFF, bind 127.0.0.1; deep-merge makes it migration-free. The
  server-owned token is preserved against renderer clobber in both
  save-global-settings handlers; the diagnostics:* IPC is the only mutator.
- app.requestSingleInstanceLock() (also the approved fix #6) so a relaunch can't
  EADDRINUSE-kill the agent and two instances can't clobber the config.

main.js: buildDiagnosticCode (mhu1_ base64url, no host embedded), start/stop +
auto-start-on-launch + stop-on-quit, the four diagnostics:* IPC handlers.
renderer: a "Diagnose-Zugriff" settings subtab (toggle, port, bind-address,
copyable connection code + regenerate, status, read-only security note).

382 tests pass (incl. 11 new: collectors+redaction, agent whitelist, and a live
RemoteServer protocol test proving auth->diag-response correlation, that a
diagnostic client never triggers the capture window, and brute-force lockout).
Lint clean (0 errors). Smoke boots identically to baseline. The standalone MCP
gateway package + operator setup docs land in a follow-up commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 17:24:32 +02:00

73 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript

const { test } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const RemoteServer = require('../lib/remote-server');
const TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64);
function startAgent(onDiagnosticRequest, extra) {
const srv = new RemoteServer();
return srv.start({ port: 0, host: '127.0.0.1', token: TOKEN, diagnosticMode: true, onDiagnosticRequest, ...(extra || {}) })
.then(() => srv);
}
function connect(port) {
return new WebSocket(`ws://127.0.0.1:${port}`);
}
function once(ws, type) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
ws.on('message', (raw) => { const m = JSON.parse(raw); if (m.type === type) resolve(m); });
ws.on('close', (code) => reject(new Error('closed ' + code)));
ws.on('error', reject);
});
}
test('diagnostic client: auth -> diag-request -> reqId-correlated diag-response', async () => {
const agent = await startAgent((msg, _client, reply) => {
assert.equal(msg.op, 'server_health');
reply({ ok: true, data: { hello: 'world', echo: msg.args } });
});
const port = agent.getPort();
const ws = connect(port);
await new Promise((r) => ws.on('open', r));
ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'auth', token: TOKEN, role: 'diagnostic' }));
const ok = await once(ws, 'auth-ok');
assert.ok(ok.clientId);
ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'diag-request', reqId: 'r1', op: 'server_health', args: { errorLimit: 3 } }));
const resp = await once(ws, 'diag-response');
assert.equal(resp.reqId, 'r1');
assert.equal(resp.ok, true);
assert.equal(resp.data.hello, 'world');
assert.equal(resp.data.echo.errorLimit, 3);
assert.equal(agent.getLastAccess() !== null, true, 'access timestamp recorded');
ws.close(); agent.stop();
});
test('a diagnostic client NEVER triggers the screen-capture window', async () => {
let captureCreated = false;
const agent = await startAgent(() => {}, { onCreateCaptureWindow: () => { captureCreated = true; } });
const ws = connect(agent.getPort());
await new Promise((r) => ws.on('open', r));
ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'auth', token: TOKEN, role: 'diagnostic' }));
await once(ws, 'auth-ok');
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
assert.equal(captureCreated, false, 'diagnosticMode must not spawn the capture window');
ws.close(); agent.stop();
});
test('wrong token is rejected and the ip is locked out after 5 attempts', async () => {
const agent = await startAgent(() => {});
const port = agent.getPort();
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
const ws = connect(port);
await new Promise((r) => ws.on('open', r));
ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'auth', token: 'wrong', role: 'diagnostic' }));
await new Promise((r) => ws.on('close', r));
}
const ws = connect(port);
const closeCode = await new Promise((resolve) => ws.on('close', (c) => resolve(c)));
assert.equal(closeCode, 4003, 'locked out after 5 failed attempts');
agent.stop();
});