Adds the connect-by-code side of remote diagnostics and closes two real secret-leak vectors that an end-to-end gateway<->agent test surfaced. Gateway (gateway/, local stdio MCP, Claude connects once): - 14 read-only tools (server_health hub, read_log, list_logs, list_errors, get_queue_state, get_history, get_config_redacted, get_system_info, get_rotation_state, get_app_events + connect/disconnect/list/current). - The HOST is always supplied by the operator, never taken from the code. - TLS fingerprint pinning is enforced in the socket 'open' handler BEFORE the token is sent (wss opt-in); plain ws is loopback-only. - registry.json (holds bearer tokens) is gitignored; only an empty example ships. Security hardening (gates every off-box payload): - redactLogText now scrubs opaque bearer/token-family secrets that are NOT stored config credentials (e.g. a session token a hoster returns inside an error string): bare token/auth_token/refresh_token/session_token + standalone "Bearer <opaque>". Benign "token bucket" prose is left intact. - get_config_redacted deep-redacts every string leaf (JSON-safe, per-leaf, so the cookie/sess line patterns can't gobble across a compact-JSON field) and drops the history subtree (served by get_history with its own per-error redaction). This plugs leaks via globalSettings.pendingQueue[].error etc. Bind-address safety: - _safeDiagBindAddress() forces the diagnostic agent to 127.0.0.1/::1; the 0.0.0.0 UI option is removed. Direct LAN/Internet bind stays disabled until encrypted transport (wss) exists — remote access goes through an SSH/VPN tunnel to loopback. (Never plaintext ws:// on all interfaces.) Tests: end-to-end gateway<->agent gate (connect -> server_health/read_log/ get_config_redacted, asserts zero secret leakage, rejects doodstream log, path traversal and write ops); + redaction regression tests in the main suite. 385 app tests + 9 gateway tests pass; lint 0 errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
60 lines
1.7 KiB
JavaScript
60 lines
1.7 KiB
JavaScript
const PREFIX = 'mhu1_';
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export function encode(payload) {
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if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') {
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throw new Error('encode: payload must be an object');
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}
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const json = JSON.stringify(payload);
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const b64 = Buffer.from(json, 'utf8').toString('base64url');
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return PREFIX + b64;
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}
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export function decode(code) {
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if (typeof code !== 'string') {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: expected a string');
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}
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const trimmed = code.trim();
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if (!trimmed.startsWith(PREFIX)) {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: missing "mhu1_" prefix');
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}
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const b64 = trimmed.slice(PREFIX.length);
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if (!b64) {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: empty payload');
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}
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let json;
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try {
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json = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64url').toString('utf8');
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} catch {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: not valid base64url');
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}
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let payload;
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try {
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payload = JSON.parse(json);
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} catch {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: payload is not valid JSON');
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}
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if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: payload is not an object');
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}
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if (payload.v !== 1) {
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throw new Error(`Invalid code: unsupported version (expected v=1, got ${payload.v})`);
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}
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if (typeof payload.port !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(payload.port)) {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: "port" must be a number');
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}
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if (typeof payload.token !== 'string' || payload.token.length === 0) {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: "token" must be a non-empty string');
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}
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if (typeof payload.label !== 'string') {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: "label" must be a string');
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}
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if (payload.fp !== undefined && typeof payload.fp !== 'string') {
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throw new Error('Invalid code: "fp" must be a string when present');
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}
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return payload;
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}
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