xRangerDEandClaude Opus 4.7 32e0b1ab7d security: open-file IPC blocks executable extensions
Companion to 4.6.61. The open-file IPC handler (used by the
"Open file" buttons in the queue + archive) was previously a
plain shell.openPath call with only an existsSync check:

  if (typeof filePath !== "string" || !filePath) return false;
  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) return false;
  const result = await shell.openPath(filePath);

shell.openPath happily launches any path the OS knows how to
execute. An XSS landing through e.g. a smuggled queue item URL
that reached the renderer-side openFile global function could
pass `C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe` and the IPC would launch
calc.

Added a deny-list of obvious shell-execution extensions (.exe,
.bat, .cmd, .com, .ps1, .vbs, .vbe, .js, .jse, .wsf, .wsh, .scr,
.msi, .msp, .lnk, .cpl, .reg, .hta, .jar, .application). Rejected
calls log to debug + return false to the renderer. Media + text +
image extensions remain unaffected — those open in their normal
default-app viewers, which is the intended use case.

show-in-folder + open-folder stay permissive on extension since
they only open File Explorer (no execution).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 04:16:46 +02:00
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