real-debrid-downloader/tools/rd-diagnostics-mcp

rd-diagnostics-mcp

Standalone stdio MCP bridge to the Real-Debrid-Downloader debug-server. It runs on the machine where the MCP client runs, takes a connection code for a downloader server, and exposes that server's read-only HTTP diagnostics API (/diagnostics, /status, /errors, /logs/*, /accounts, …) as MCP tools. One bridge serves all 5–6 servers; you pass a code (or a configured server name) per call.

This bridge is not bundled into the Electron app and adds no dependencies to it.

Setup

cd tools/rd-diagnostics-mcp
npm install

Register it with your MCP client as a stdio server that launches the bridge:

node "<repo>/tools/rd-diagnostics-mcp/src/bridge.mjs"

Provide servers via environment variables (codes contain a token — treat like passwords):

• RDDIAG_CODE — a single default connection code (rddiag:v1:...)
• RDDIAG_SERVERS — JSON map of name → code, e.g. {"berlin":"rddiag:v1:...","fra":"rddiag:v1:..."}

Without env config, every tool simply takes a code argument.

Tools

rd_servers, rd_ping, rd_diagnostics, rd_status, rd_items, rd_packages, rd_errors, rd_logs, rd_history, rd_accounts, rd_host, rd_self_check, rd_get (raw escape-hatch, any read-only path).

Each tool accepts code or server to pick the target.

Connection code

Format: rddiag:v1:<base64url(JSON)> with { v:1, h:host, p:port, t:token, n?:name, fp?:certFingerprint, s?:scheme }. Generated by the app (Hilfe → Remote-Support → Ferndiagnose (MCP)) or via node src/gen-code.mjs --host H --port P --token T.

Security model (read before exposing a server)

• The debug surface is read-only for state/logs; the one control endpoint is /trace/config (toggles the optional, time-bounded support trace). No persistent secrets are written into the logs it serves: passwords are redacted, debrid API keys/tokens and resolved download URLs are never logged; /settings and /accounts are redacted.
• Auth is a bearer token (24 random bytes). Over plain HTTP on a public network the token is sniffable, so:
  • Preferred: keep the server bound to 127.0.0.1 ("Nur lokal") and reach it through a private tunnel (Tailscale / SSH / Cloudflare Tunnel). The tunnel encrypts and authenticates; no public exposure.
  • Direct network bind (0.0.0.0) requires a non-empty IP allowlist (enforced fail-closed: with an empty allowlist only loopback is accepted). Use only inside a trusted LAN/VPN.
• Revoke instantly from the app ("Token neu" or "Deaktivieren") — the old code stops working immediately.
• fp pins a self-signed cert fingerprint and is verified on secureConnect (before the token is sent). HTTPS is not the v1 default; plain HTTP behind a tunnel is the recommended transport.

Test

npm test    # spins a fake debug-server, runs the bridge as a stdio child, asserts the full protocol path