c8beaf96ed
Neue Funktion, um Diagnose eines laufenden Servers aus der Ferne zu ermoeglichen:
Hilfe -> Remote-Support -> "Ferndiagnose (MCP)". Erzeugt einen Verbindungscode,
den der Assistent nutzt, um Status, Logs, Fehler und Accounts read-only zu lesen.
App-Seite:
- Live (re)startbarer Debug-Server ohne App-Neustart (restartDebugServer wartet auf
'close' + closeAllConnections, behandelt EADDRINUSE).
- IP-Allowlist (debug_allowlist.txt, exakte IP + CIDR), erzwungen VOR der Auth.
Fail-closed: Netzwerk-Bind (0.0.0.0) ohne Allowlist akzeptiert nur Loopback.
- One-Click Aktivieren/Aktualisieren/Deaktivieren + Token-Rotation (alter Code sofort
ungueltig). Sichtbarkeit waehlbar: "Nur lokal" (Tunnel-Empfehlung) vs "Im Netzwerk".
- Verbindungscode rddiag:v1:base64url({v,h,p,t,n?,fp?,s?}); oeffentlicher Host frei
waehlbar, Netzwerk-IPs als Schnellauswahl.
- Neue IPC: get/enable/disable/rotate Remote-Diagnostics; Controller-Methoden; Typen.
Bridge (tools/rd-diagnostics-mcp, standalone, KEINE App-Dependency):
- stdio MCP-Server (@modelcontextprotocol/sdk) mit 14 Tools, proxyt die bestehende
HTTP-Debug-API. Multi-Server ueber code/server/RDDIAG_CODE/RDDIAG_SERVERS.
- TLS-Fingerprint-Pinning auf secureConnect (vor Token-Versand), falls https genutzt.
- test/harness.mjs: faehrt einen Fake-Debug-Server hoch und treibt die Bridge als
echten stdio-Child per JSON-RPC -> voller Protokollpfad gruen.
Sicherheit (Audit): keine persistenten Secrets in den Logs der Debug-API (Passwoerter
redigiert, keine Debrid-Keys/aufgeloesten Download-URLs geloggt; settings/accounts
redigiert). Empfohlener Transport: Loopback + privater Tunnel; Direkt-Bind nur mit
Allowlist in vertrauenswuerdigen Netzen.
Tests: connection-code-Cross-Check (App-Encoder <-> Bridge-Decoder), Allowlist-Matrix
(Loopback, exakt, CIDR, fail-closed, Live-Restart). Volle Suite 905 gruen, tsc=6.
61 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
61 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# rd-diagnostics-mcp
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Standalone **stdio MCP bridge** to the Real-Debrid-Downloader debug-server. It runs on the machine where the
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AI assistant (Claude Code) runs, takes a **connection code** for a downloader server, and exposes that server's
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read-only HTTP diagnostics API (`/diagnostics`, `/status`, `/errors`, `/logs/*`, `/accounts`, …) as MCP tools.
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One bridge serves all 5–6 servers; you pass a `code` (or a configured `server` name) per call.
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This bridge is **not** bundled into the Electron app and adds **no** dependencies to it.
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## Setup
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```bash
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cd tools/rd-diagnostics-mcp
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npm install
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```
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Register it with Claude Code (single default server):
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```bash
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claude mcp add rd-diag -- node "<repo>/tools/rd-diagnostics-mcp/src/bridge.mjs"
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```
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Provide servers via environment variables (codes contain a token — treat like passwords):
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- `RDDIAG_CODE` — a single default connection code (`rddiag:v1:...`)
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- `RDDIAG_SERVERS` — JSON map of name → code, e.g. `{"berlin":"rddiag:v1:...","fra":"rddiag:v1:..."}`
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Without env config, every tool simply takes a `code` argument.
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## Tools
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`rd_servers`, `rd_ping`, `rd_diagnostics`, `rd_status`, `rd_items`, `rd_packages`, `rd_errors`, `rd_logs`,
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`rd_history`, `rd_accounts`, `rd_host`, `rd_self_check`, `rd_get` (raw escape-hatch, any read-only path).
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Each tool accepts `code` or `server` to pick the target.
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## Connection code
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Format: `rddiag:v1:<base64url(JSON)>` with `{ v:1, h:host, p:port, t:token, n?:name, fp?:certFingerprint, s?:scheme }`.
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Generated by the app (Hilfe → Remote-Support → Ferndiagnose (MCP)) or via `node src/gen-code.mjs --host H --port P --token T`.
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## Security model (read before exposing a server)
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- The debug surface is **read-only** for state/logs; the one control endpoint is `/trace/config` (toggles the
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optional, time-bounded support trace). No persistent secrets are written into the logs it serves: passwords are
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redacted, debrid API keys/tokens and resolved download URLs are never logged; `/settings` and `/accounts` are redacted.
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- Auth is a bearer token (24 random bytes). Over plain HTTP on a public network the token is sniffable, so:
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- **Preferred:** keep the server bound to `127.0.0.1` ("Nur lokal") and reach it through a private tunnel
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(Tailscale / SSH / Cloudflare Tunnel). The tunnel encrypts and authenticates; no public exposure.
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- **Direct network bind (`0.0.0.0`)** requires a non-empty **IP allowlist** (enforced fail-closed: with an empty
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allowlist only loopback is accepted). Use only inside a trusted LAN/VPN.
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- Revoke instantly from the app ("Token neu" or "Deaktivieren") — the old code stops working immediately.
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- `fp` pins a self-signed cert fingerprint and is verified on `secureConnect` (before the token is sent). HTTPS is
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not the v1 default; plain HTTP behind a tunnel is the recommended transport.
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## Test
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```bash
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npm test # spins a fake debug-server, runs the bridge as a stdio child, asserts the full protocol path
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```
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