real-debrid-downloader/tests/debug-server-allowlist.test.ts
Sucukdeluxe 95d284f687 Sicherheit: Allowlist anhand des echten Socket-Peers statt X-Forwarded-For
Die Allowlist-Pruefung nutzte extractDebugClientIp, das X-Forwarded-For zuerst
auswertet - ein angreiferkontrollierter Header. Damit konnte ein entfernter Client
auf einem 0.0.0.0-Bind die Allowlist komplett umgehen (X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 ->
als Loopback gewertet). Die Allowlist bot so keinerlei Schutz; nur das Token blieb.

Fix: Enforcement liest jetzt ausschliesslich req.socket.remoteAddress (getPeerIp),
das vom Kernel aus der TCP-Verbindung gesetzt wird und nicht per Header faelschbar ist.
X-Forwarded-For wird nur noch fuer das Trace-Log (Beobachtbarkeit) verwendet, nie fuer
die Zugriffsentscheidung. Reine, exportierte Matcher-Funktion evaluateClientAllowed.

Tests umgebaut auf den Threat-Model statt den faelschbaren Kanal: Unit-Tests fuer
Loopback/exakt/CIDR/fail-closed + expliziter Forged-XFF-Test (socket.remoteAddress
8.8.8.8 + X-Forwarded-For 127.0.0.1 -> verweigert). Integration: Loopback verbindet,
gespooftes X-Forwarded-For wird ignoriert, Auth bleibt erzwungen, Live-Reload.
2026-06-19 17:10:11 +02:00

147 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript

import fs from "node:fs";
import http from "node:http";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { once } from "node:events";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
startDebugServer,
stopDebugServer,
restartDebugServer,
writeDebugServerConfig,
getDebugServerRuntimeStatus,
evaluateClientAllowed,
getPeerIp
} from "../src/main/debug-server";
import type { DownloadManager } from "../src/main/download-manager";
const tempDirs: string[] = [];
const TOKEN = "allowlist-secret";
async function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
const probe = http.createServer();
probe.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
await once(probe, "listening");
const address = probe.address();
if (!address || typeof address === "string") {
throw new Error("port probe failed");
}
probe.close();
await once(probe, "close");
return address.port;
}
async function waitForReady(url: string): Promise<void> {
const deadline = Date.now() + 5000;
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
try {
const res = await fetch(url);
if (res.ok) {
return;
}
} catch {
}
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 40));
}
throw new Error(`debug server not ready: ${url}`);
}
async function startWithAllowlist(allowlist: string[], host = "0.0.0.0"): Promise<{ baseUrl: string }> {
const baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "rd-allow-"));
tempDirs.push(baseDir);
const port = await getFreePort();
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(baseDir, "debug_token.txt"), TOKEN, "utf8");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(baseDir, "debug_port.txt"), String(port), "utf8");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(baseDir, "debug_host.txt"), host, "utf8");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(baseDir, "debug_allowlist.txt"), allowlist.join("\n"), "utf8");
const manager = {} as unknown as DownloadManager;
startDebugServer(manager, baseDir);
const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
await waitForReady(`${baseUrl}/health?token=${TOKEN}`);
return { baseUrl };
}
afterEach(() => {
stopDebugServer();
while (tempDirs.length > 0) {
const dir = tempDirs.pop();
if (!dir) {
continue;
}
try {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
}
}
});
describe("debug-server allowlist matcher (pure)", () => {
it("always allows loopback regardless of rules", () => {
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("127.0.0.1", [])).toBe(true);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("::1", [])).toBe(true);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("::ffff:127.0.0.1", ["8.8.8.8"])).toBe(true);
});
it("matches an exact allowlisted IP and rejects others", () => {
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("8.8.8.8", ["8.8.8.8"])).toBe(true);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("9.9.9.9", ["8.8.8.8"])).toBe(false);
});
it("matches inside a CIDR and rejects outside it", () => {
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("10.0.0.42", ["10.0.0.0/24"])).toBe(true);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("10.0.1.42", ["10.0.0.0/24"])).toBe(false);
});
it("fail-closed: empty rules reject every non-loopback client", () => {
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("203.0.113.7", [])).toBe(false);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed("8.8.8.8", [])).toBe(false);
});
it("derives the client IP from the socket peer, never from X-Forwarded-For", () => {
const forgedLoopback = {
socket: { remoteAddress: "8.8.8.8" },
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "127.0.0.1" }
} as unknown as http.IncomingMessage;
expect(getPeerIp(forgedLoopback)).toBe("8.8.8.8");
expect(evaluateClientAllowed(getPeerIp(forgedLoopback), [])).toBe(false);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed(getPeerIp(forgedLoopback), ["9.9.9.9"])).toBe(false);
expect(evaluateClientAllowed(getPeerIp(forgedLoopback), ["8.8.8.8"])).toBe(true);
const ipv6Mapped = {
socket: { remoteAddress: "::ffff:10.0.0.5" },
headers: {}
} as unknown as http.IncomingMessage;
expect(getPeerIp(ipv6Mapped)).toBe("10.0.0.5");
});
});
describe("debug-server allowlist enforcement (wired)", () => {
it("allows a loopback connection and ignores a spoofed X-Forwarded-For", async () => {
const { baseUrl } = await startWithAllowlist(["8.8.8.8"]);
const plain = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health?token=${TOKEN}`);
expect(plain.status).toBe(200);
const spoofed = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health?token=${TOKEN}`, {
headers: { "X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.9" }
});
expect(spoofed.status).toBe(200);
});
it("still enforces the token for loopback clients", async () => {
const { baseUrl } = await startWithAllowlist(["8.8.8.8"]);
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health`);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it("reloads the allowlist live via restartDebugServer", async () => {
const { baseUrl } = await startWithAllowlist(["8.8.8.8"]);
expect(getDebugServerRuntimeStatus().allowlistCount).toBe(1);
writeDebugServerConfig({ allowlist: ["9.9.9.9", "10.0.0.0/24"] });
const status = await restartDebugServer();
expect(status.running).toBe(true);
expect(status.allowlistCount).toBe(2);
await waitForReady(`${baseUrl}/health?token=${TOKEN}`);
expect((await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health?token=${TOKEN}`)).status).toBe(200);
});
});